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LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY
JEREMIAH A. HO*
Our conceptions of law affect how we objectify the law and ultimately how
we study it. Despite a century’s worth of theoretical progress in American
law—from legal realism to critical legal studies movements and
postmodernism—the formalist conception of “law as science,” as promulgated
by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in the late-nineteenth century,
continues to influence the inductive methodologies used today to impart
knowledge in American legal education. This lasting influence of the
Langdellian scientific conception of law has persisted even as the present crisis
in legal education has engendered other reforms. However, subsequent
movements of legal thought have revealed that the law is neither scientific nor
“objective” in the way the Langdellian formalists once envisioned. After all,
the Langdellian scientific objectivity of law itself reflected the dominant class,
gender, power, and race of its nineteenth-century progenitors. Thus, by
sustaining the illusion of scientific objectivity, the continued application of
Langdellian pedagogy distorts our understandings of law and abridges
individual explorations of pluralism, subjectivity, justice, and empowerment.
Such prevailing false notions of neutrality in law leads to both disenchantment
and hierarchy in legal practice, but worse it also distracts from meanings of
law that would otherwise have led to empowerment and critique. In this way,
legal scholars have clamored for a post-Langdellian legal conception to enable
us to reach more relevant and emboldened meanings in law.
Prompted by such calls amidst the post-Recession crisis in the American
legal academy, this Article offers such a new conception for theorizing
meanings in law by locating law within its instrumentalities. “Law as
instrumentality” obtains meaning by accepting law’s fragmentation and then
observing, from fragmentation, the characteristics of its agency. The law is not
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a science; but it does embody human-made qualities of agency. This new
instrumentality conception studies law’s deliberate aesthetics as a way to
explore law ontologically and critique its goals, its devices, its intentions, its
significances, and its teleologies.
From this conception, a broader
methodology can arise to bring about a more relevant and empowering
understanding of law to those who render it to life.
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INTRODUCTION

Lawyers are typically a pessimistic lot.1 For better or worse examples of
this age old observation have reared themselves noticeably during this present
crisis in American legal academy and education2—a period that has drifted
perilously on tides of the Great Recession.3 Observations based on popular
psychology tend to avoid being completely truthful on a particular subject.4

1. See Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 39–41
(2001) (characterizing lawyers as pessimistic and describing the causes of such pessimism in lawyers).
2. See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html [https://perma.cc/AC6T-QSN4] (“But
improbably enough, law schools have concluded that life for newly minted grads is getting sweeter . . . .
How do law schools depict a feast amid so much famine?”); Megan McArdle, The Perils of Law
School: A Chat with Paul Campos, Author of Don’t Go to Law School!, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 24,
2012),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/24/the-perils-of-law-school.html
[https://perma.cc/6UU5-4LCU]. During the interview Campos stated, “Yes indeed, but the waterline
has now risen so high that large portions of the classes at top ten law schools are struggling, so now
there’s a ‘crisis.’” Id.
3. Jordan Weissmann, What Do Lawyers and Bankers Have in Common? They Lost Jobs in
2011, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/what-dolawyers-and-bankers-have-incommon-they-lost-jobs-in-2011/251130/ [https://perma.cc/3EJ3-P4GG].
4. See Peter Brooks, Law, Therapy, Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 237 (2001)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s substituting of “popular psychology” for “common sense” in a
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Every once in a while, however, an observation reveals a beacon of truth.5 Not
long after national enrollment amongst law schools began to decline and the
outside world took notice with scrutiny in 2011,6 the word, “crisis,” was first
uttered within the legal academy.7 From its initial nervous whisper, this
utterance of crisis did not go unheard.8 At first, there were defensive stances
of denial.9 Very shortly, nonetheless, the facade of denial gave way to reveal a
deep sense of anxiety—the contagious kind that spreads rapidly amongst a
group of pessimistic individuals.10 Once the anxiety set in, the halls of the
American legal academy, as narrow as they are hallowed, served as an echo
chamber, repeating and amplifying and ruminating over the notion of crisis
until the noise became a collective cry of distress.11 Then not long after, distress
crystallized into action by law school and university administrations and much
of it was swift in a corporate sense: cut-backs on faculty scholarship monies,12

criminal decision as “rhetorical self-blinding”); see also Mary L. Tenopyra, A Scientist-Practitioner’s
Viewpoint on the Admissibility of Behavioral and Social Scientific Information, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 194, 197 (1999) (“[P]opular psychology that obtains considerable publicity is often at odds
with scientific psychology.”).
5. See Kevin W. Saunders, The Framers, Children, and Free Expression, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 187, 235 (2011) (noting how academic psychology and popular psychology are
something in accord).
6. Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 177, 185
(2012); Weissmann, supra note 3.
7. See McArdle, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and the Competition in Legal Education:
A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 24
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503 (2013); Campos, supra note 6, at 179.
9. See Segal, supra note 2 (“But improbably enough, law schools have concluded that life for
newly minted grads is getting sweeter. . . . How do law schools depict a feast amid so much famine?”).
10. Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-law-schools.html
[https://perma.cc/QB9W-H8SC] (“Law schools have hustled to compensate for these shifts by trying
to make it look as if their graduates are more marketable, even hiring them as research assistants to
offer temporary employment. But those strategies won’t fix legal education . . . .”).
11. ABA COMM’N ON THE IMPACT OF THE ECON. CRISES ON THE PROFESSION AND LEGAL
NEEDS,
THE
VALUE
P ROPOSITION
OF
ATTENDING
LAW
SCHOOL
(2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/lsd/legaled/value.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XYE7-RV4S].
12. Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Future of Scholarship in Law Schools, 31 TOURO L. REV. 15, 19 (2014)
(“In the past few years, these scholarship incentives have been reduced or withdrawn, a trend that is
likely to continue into the foreseeable future.”).
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buy-outs,13 rebuke,14 rumors of school closures,15 reduction in staff,16 and pullbacks on faculty hiring,17 to name a few. Simultaneously, a series of how-to
reform legal education articles and books bombarded the literature.18 A blame
game began to surface from all directions.19 On a day-to-day level at law
schools, reports of dramatic changes prompted by apprehension and concern at
law school were not uncommon.20 In studying all of these events as part of
classic pessimistic behavior, these responses should not surprise ourselves; in
times of real or perceived crisis, pessimists (lawyers and law professors
included) will often abandon ship, reach for a raft of security, and internalize
obsessively about self-preservation—all the while hopefully searching for a
new course.21
13. Mary Moore, New England Law Offers Faculty Buyouts, Dean Takes Pay Cut, BOSTON BUS.
J. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2013/10/29/new-england-law-dean-paybuyout.html [https://perma.cc/R65J-CWRC].
14. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM 17 (2014) (“[L]aw schools’ current business model is not only unsustainable but
immoral.”).
15. See Erin Fuchs, The Law School Crisis Could Crush ‘Stand-Alone’ Schools, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan.
31,
2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/which-law-schools-might-fail-2013-1
[https://perma.cc/5CG5-V2RN].
16. Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools Are Cutting Faculty,
WALL
S T.
J.
(July
15,
2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323664204578607810292433272
[https://perma.cc/5S6F-NMFD] (reporting law schools’ faculty lay-offs after “having trimmed staff”);
Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Schools Cope With Declining Enrollment by Quietly Cutting Faculty, ABA
J.
(July
16,
2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_schools_cope_with_declining_enrollment_by_quietly_
cutting_faculty [https://perma.cc/AVJ2-CGM6].
17. Law Schools Put Hiring Freeze on Faculty, N.J. BUS. (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.njbiz.com/article/20121012/NJBIZ01/121019932/law-schools-put-hiring-freeze-onfaculty [https://perma.cc/9H6B-CSYE].
18. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Educating Lawyers for Community, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 115
(2012); Farida Ali, Globalizing the U.S. Law School Curriculum: How Should Legal Educators
Respond?, 41 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 249 (2013); Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell:
Innovating in Legal Education, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 643 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Paul Campos, Stop Blaming the Law School Bubble on the 2007 Financial Crisis,
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-caused-the-law-school-bubble2013-2 [https://perma.cc/6N35-LQSE]; Bruce Feldthusen, Legal Profession in Turmoil: Let’s Blame
the
Law
Schools,
CANADIAN
LAW.
MAG.
(Dec.
3,
2012),
http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4429/Legal-profession-in-turmoil-Lets-blame-the-lawschools.html [https://perma.cc/TC95-GDTX].
20. See, e.g., Alicia Albertson, New England Law Downsizing Enrollment, Faculty Size, NAT’L.
JURIST (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.nationaljurist.com/prelaw/new-england-law-downsizingenrollment-faculty-size [https://perma.cc/PL4B-3X8R].
21. See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 11–12 (1988).
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At first, internalization from within the legal academy came most notably
from Brian Tamanaha and his book, Failing Law Schools,22 which prominently
attempted to explain the economic causes of the post-Recession law school
crisis.23 Although Tamanaha was not the only one critiquing law schools from
a financial perspective,24 his work was arguably the most widely read and
discussed.25 In Failing Law Schools, Tamanaha argued that the post-Recession
law school crisis had essentially two culprits. First, law school tuitions had
surpassed inflation to amounts that heavily burdened students with outstanding
debt upon graduation.26 He culled through much empirical data to demonstrate
the phenomena of this debt-to-inflation ratio.27 But even as he cites an
anecdotal example by comparing different generations of law students, his
point was rather illustrative:
Law students in the seventies and early eighties who worked at
corporate law firms during the summer could earn enough to
cover the following year’s tuition and perhaps some living
expenses. This helped keep down the level of debt. Despite
the dramatic increase in starting associate pay at corporate law
firms that occurred in the early 2000s, the best-paying summer
jobs today, which few students land, generate enough income
for a student to pay half, at most, of one year’s tuition at a top
school.28
Such debt-to-inflation ratios, Tamanaha observed, would impede upon new
law school graduates’ options as they move into their careers.29 Money, after
all, gives one options in employment and life-style. But he was not finished
yet; another causal reason for the crisis, Tamanaha observed, was that post22. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., PAUL CAMPOS, DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS): A LAW PROFESSOR’S
GUIDE TO MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITY AND MINIMIZING RISK (2012); Campos, supra note 6;
McArdle, supra note 2.
25. See generally David Burk, Book Review, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 349 (2013) (reviewing BRIAN
Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012)); Charles Lane, Book Review: ‘Failing Law Schools’
by Brian Z. Tamanaha¸ WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bookreview-failing-law-schools-by-brian-z-tamanaha/2012/ [https://perma.cc/UY3A-S2L6] (insert URL
into Google.com search engine, then follow “Book Review: Failing Law Schools by Brian Z.
Tamahana” hyperlink).
26. See TAMANAHA, supra note 22, at 108.
27. See id. at 108–09.
28. Id. at 109.
29. See, e.g., id. at 111–12 (citing an example with a law student named “Sarah”).
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graduation employment levels at law schools were in jeopardy.30 The shrunken
post-2008 legal job market was not able to allow the adequate match between
the number of attorney jobs available and the number of new graduates that law
schools were producing.31 According to Tamanaha, instead of reducing the size
of classes, “[l]aw schools responded to this abysmal job environment by
increasing the number of students they enrolled in 2009, and yet again in
2010—thereby promising to throw out even more law graduates onto the
saturated employment pool three years hence.”32 Of course, he was not the sole
voice to make these inspections on law school business practices.33 Critics,
both within legal education and beyond, similarly targeted the economics of
law schools during this era of crisis.34
This opportunity for deep internalization in legal education, led by
Tamanaha’s book, also prompted and stoked critiques of other aspects of legal
education, particularly in the effects that recent cultural and generational shifts
in law students have had on law schools and professionalism,35 and also on the
uses of new technology in law teaching.36 At first, the discussion of cultural
and curricular reform in law schools (particularly those that resembled the
Carnegie Report,37 MacCrate,38 and Best Practices)39 going into the Great
Recession were sidelined briefly for a time, perhaps as the academy’s attention
was honing in on too-big-to-fail characterizations of law school business and

30. Id. at 145–60.
31. Id. at 167.
32. Id.
33. See generally STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS (2013);
William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013); CAMPOS, supra note
24.
34. See CAMPOS, supra note 24; HARPER, supra note 33; Henderson, supra note 33.
35. See, e.g., Emily A. Benfer & Colleen F. Shanahan, Educating the Invincibles: Strategies for
Teaching the Millennial Generation in Law School, 20 N.Y.U. CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2013); Susan
Swaim Daicoff, Expanding the Lawyer’s Toolkit of Skills and Competencies: Synthesizing Leadership,
Professionalism, Emotional Intelligence, Conflict Resolution, and Comprehensive Law, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 795 (2012).
36. Brittany Stringfellow Otey, Millennials, Technology, and Professional Responsibility:
Training a New Generation in Technological Professionalism, 37 J. LEGAL PROF. 199 passim (2013).
37. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW (2007).
38. ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 137–41 (1992).
39. ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).
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marketing practices rather than pedagogical reforms.40 But as interest in the
economic narratives of law schools began to even out, scholarly discussions
regarding the old skills-versus-doctrinal debate in law teaching reignited—
particularly because, in light of low employment statistics, the teaching of skills
would, in theory, contribute to the competency and employability of students
and graduates.41 Still that shift proceeded cautiously,42 and some articles in
advocating skills and practice during this time took on a neoliberalist tone.43
Others in the academy, such as Edward Rubin and Robin West, have called for
more profound changes to the core philosophy of American law teaching and
pedagogy at this time instead.44 However, such critical observations have taken
a backseat to more short-term solutions on teaching skills because an overhaul
of legal pedagogy would require a deeper connection drawn between
perspectives on the meaning of law itself and its underlying theory.45 In short,
despite all the crisis-talk and inward obsessions, the current subject matter of
teaching of law students has a large body of technical insight and pedagogical
discourse, but lacks any unifying sense of what modern law schools ought to
look like beyond the nineteenth-century model promulgated by Christopher
Langdell at Harvard Law School.46

40. See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, The
Public, And The Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 231 (2007) (“Langdell’s method endures
because, although his pedagogy no longer makes sense, his system makes money.”).
41. See, e.g., Ali, supra note 18; Jennison, supra note 18.
42. See Benfer & Shanahan, supra note 35, at 5–6.
43. Margaret Thornton, Legal Education in the Corporate University, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 19, 23 (2014). Thornton writes that, in law schools, “[t]he discourse of skills also carries a subtext
with it . . . with the term often being ‘used interchangeably with capacity, knowledge, expertise and so
forth.’ Skills tend to play a special role in the neoliberal labor market and are privileged over critical
and theoretical knowledge.” Id. (citation omitted).
44. See Edward Rubin, The Future and Legal Education: Are Law Schools Failing and, If So,
How?, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 499, 507 (2014) [hereinafter Rubin, Future and Legal Education]
(“What is its future and what should that future be? For that we need to adopt a broader perspective
than the existing market for lawyers and a longer timeframe than the immediate crisis and its near-term
resolution.”); WEST, supra note 14, at 23.
45. See Dolin, supra note 40, at 246–47 (“In this environment, it is extremely unlikely that
meaningful change will come from within the academy. . . . Practitioners have been intimidated by
the professorate, assuming that they know better than practitioners the best way to educate practicing
lawyers. However, they do not.”).
46. WEST, supra note 14, at 27–35.
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There have been some meaningful changes.47 As an era of reckoning drew
near, accountability—moral and economic—descended upon the academy like
swift justice. Questions of relevance regarding American law schools and
traditional legal education have steered many law schools to quickly add
phrases such as “practice ready” and “experiential learning” alongside their
traditional curricular programming and offerings in order to demonstrate that
their current and prospective students would get their monies’ worth.48 In
earnest, law school institutions had thoughtful intentions when they
strengthened such parts of the law school experience that had been previously
auxiliary.49 In theory and practice, this first wave of change had positive
effects. Building up clinical legal education, externship, and pro bono
requirements at law schools facilitates law graduate competency and,
hopefully, marketability.50 They also reflect an acknowledgement that law
practice is something one learns, in part, by doing.51 After all, was it not
Holmes who said that the life of the law was not merely logic but also
experience?52
More questionably, a second wave of change came along that mandated
learning assessments in legal education.53 In 2015, the American Bar
Association (ABA) passed Standards 301, 302, 314, and 315 that required law
schools to conduct learning assessments,54 and subsequently the law schools
began to obey.55 Although some in the academy have urged for decades for
law schools to implement learning assessments while others have vilified
assessments,56 the crisis precipitated the ABA to pass what had only been a
47. Nancy J. Knauer, Learning Communities: A New Model for Legal Education, 7 ELON L.
REV. 193, 195–98 (2015).
48. See id.
49. See Marjorie A. Silver, Symposium Introduction: Humanism Goes to Law School, 28 TOURO
L. REV. 1141, 1171 (2012) (“Among other changes designed to expose students to what lawyers
actually do in practice, we incorporated a requirement . . . that each of us spend a significant portion
of the course teaching our students about alternatives to litigation.”).
50. See Knauer, supra note 47, at 196–98, 208.
51. See id.
52. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
53. ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: 2015–2016, at 23 (2015).
54. Id. at 15–25.
55. David Thomson, When the ABA Comes Calling, Let’s Speak the Same Language Assessment,
23 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 68 (2014).
56. Compare GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS (2000), with
Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are Coming to A Law School Near You–
What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes & Assessment, 16 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 605, 610 (2010).
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proposal and now all law schools have begun in-house assessments of student
learning and competency.57 The undergraduate campuses of colleges and
universities had been engaged in these practices since the early 1980s.58 So
when American legal education began to embrace the assessment movement in
higher education, some suggested this embrace signified that law schools had
finally caught up with the rest of American higher education.59 Conferences
regarding assessments have, since then, taken place on various law school
campuses nationwide.60 Faculty exchange of assessment rubrics have become
more commonplace.61 Thoughts of distilling teaching and pedagogy into
metrics and measurables have consumed much faculty governance, of late.62
On the surface, the learning assessment movement offers a solution with the
theme of accountability prevalent during law schools in crisis-mode,
particularly because law schools had been famous for little assessment action.63
Law schools can now claim that they are being thoughtful or self-reflective in
response to questions about relevance that have existed in the past several
decades of law teaching. After redesigning business models and career
engagement, measuring how law is taught and what students learn seems like
one method to address the curricular and pedagogical issues that have haunted
57. MICHELLE R. PISTONE & MICHAEL B. HORN, DISRUPTING LAW SCHOOL: HOW DISRUPTIVE
INNOVATION
WILL
REVOLUTIONIZE
THE
LEGAL
WORLD
17
(2000),
https://www.christenseninstitute.org/publications/disrupting-law-school/
[https://perma.cc/8B4TPEVV].
58. Peter T. Ewell, Assessment, Accountability, and Improvement: Revisiting the Tension, NAT’L
INST. F OR LEARNING OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT, Nov. 2009, at 5–6 (citing Peter T. Ewell, Assessment,
Accountability, and Improvement: Managing the Contradiction (American Ass’n for Higher Educ.,
May
1987)),
http://www.learningoutcomeassessment.org/documents/PeterEwell_005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQ8Y-B25Y].
59. See Anthony Niedwiecki, Law Schools and Learning Outcomes: Developing a Coherent,
Cohesive, and Comprehensive Law School Curriculum, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 664–65 (2016) (“In
light of these fundamental changes, criticisms, recommendations, and requirements, law schools must
now be more deliberate in the planning of their curriculum so it is coherent, cohesive, and
comprehensive.”).
60. See, e.g., April 2014: Assessment Across the Curriculum, INST. FOR LAW TEACHING &
LEARNING (Apr. 2014), http://lawteaching.org/conferences/april-2014-assessment-across-thecurriculum/ [https://perma.cc/AB5C-W5B4].
61. See,
e.g.,
Resources,
INST.
FOR
LAW
TEACHING
&
LEARNING,
http://lawteaching.org/resources/ [https://perma.cc/JA4T-3GRA] (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
62. Ron M. Aizen, Four Ways to Better 1L Assessments, 54 DUKE L.J. 765, 779–84 (2004).
63. Id. at 767 (“[F]irst-year law students typically receive course grades based entirely, or almost
entirely, on single end-of-course essay exams. Using a single exam to measure law student
performance contrasts markedly with earlier practices at American law schools.”).
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American legal education for decades—issues that many have highlighted as
reasons law schools have become irrelevant in the wake of the post-recession.64
Perhaps this was an apt time to show the world that American legal education
was finally on the move.
But while many have written about the pros and cons of assessment and
explored exactly how to assess,65 few people have contemplated the big,
existential, “So what?” questions once law schools have done their
assessments. What exactly are we trying to find through assessments? And
will we find it? Genuine, thoughtful motivations to perform in-house
assessments keep law schools accountable,66 but political motivations for
requiring assessments is not a moral response to the law school crisis. In this
way, over-blown, chest-pounding hopes that assessments will overhaul
American legal education ought to be suspect and tamed. The assessments
movement in legal education is only skin-deep; it is a new fad.67 Not only that,
but the fad is one that officially ushers the view that law schools are now part
of the age of neoliberalism and corporatized higher education institutions.68
Should all of this give pessimists some pause? Absolutely. To be sure, done
earnestly and correctly, learning assessments offer much utility to improve
quality education. But the process is short-sighted when we neglect what we
will do after the results of assessment have come in, and allow our results to

64. Campos, supra note 6, at 180 (discussing the increase in tuition cost and the elimination of
a political commitment to legal education); id. at 185 (noting drop in faculty-to-student ratio).
65. See Aizen, supra note 62; Niedwiecki, supra note 59.
66. Bonnie Urciuoli, The Language of Higher Education Assessment: Legislative Concerns in A
Global Context, 12 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 183, 188 (2005) (quoting The State of American Higher
Education: What Are Parents, Students, and Taxpayers Getting for their Money?: Hearing Before the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 1–3 (2003) (statement of Rep. John
Boehner, Comm. Chairman)).
67. See Niedwiecki, supra note 59, at 666.
68. See Urciuoli, supra note 66, at 183–84 (“While most academics have never found any simple
answers to this question, the corporate and government voices initiating these calls for assessment have
tended for the past century to see higher education in terms of workforce preparation. Since 1980 or
so, a globalized rhetoric of skills and workforce preparedness has emerged with which U.S. discourses
of education, skills, and work have become tightly coherent. In effect, this has become the new global
‘common sense’ rhetoric of workforce preparedness. Moreover, this globalized neoliberal discourse
has often taken place in conservative social and political contexts, giving it not only the aura of
common sense but of moral correctness as well. In this discourse, the central point of educational
assessment is the assessment of skills that have a workplace payoff, skills having become a general
term for practices or forms of knowledge that fit a worker into a job. Education as a process of
inculcating skills is ideally cast as a life-long investment in human capital. Such rhetoric of education
and continual skill improvement deflects attention from the structural changes of late capitalism.”);
Thornton, supra note 43, at 23.
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skew responses that all is good with our status quo. In this way, the assessment
process is also not completely objective and scientific.
This Article is about answering the yearning for a lasting, meaningful
change to American law teaching philosophy in this time of crisis for American
law schools. As Robin West has articulated, “just as we cannot address our
economic crisis in a meaningful way without also addressing the existential, we
cannot do the inverse of that either.”69 A little over a century’s time of
establishing and formalizing a significant tradition of American legal education
has passed.70 Yet still, law schools continue to impart knowledge and training
using a pedagogy steeped in the nineteenth century71—while the current state
of the law and law practice has surpassed a reliance on the common law, and
while predominant ways of reaching doctrinal resolutions to new controversies
and disputes do not always rely on reading ancient and seminal appellate
decisions. It is no wonder why lawyers are pessimistic. We are taught to be
that way as an indirect result of our current pedagogy.72 The optimistic silver
lining in this time of crisis ought to have been a moment of clarity that allowed
us to examine with critical and scholarly eyes what relevance a methodology
guided by “law as science,” in the Langdellian sense, remained presently. How
we envision the law manifests in the pedagogy and methods of its study. What
this Article offers is a new paradigm for conceptualizing meaning in law for the
purpose of engendering more relevance and empowerment—a paradigm that
can navigate beyond assessments, but more importantly, allow individuals to
think rigorously and learn about the law in a more current and meaningful way.
This Article’s ultimate recommendation for the American legal academy is to
move toward a post-Langdellian conception of law that perceives and defines
law by its deliberate instrumentalities, rather as a form of science. The ensuing
pages, hopefully, will clarify the meaning of that heuristic shared by this
Article’s title, “law as instrumentality.”
This Article theorizes the type of deep and profound reform that not only
will help restrain the pessimists from jumping ship but changes that American
legal education deserves. Apart from this Introduction, Part II of this Article
will discuss the specific history and background of American legal education
69. WEST, supra note 14, at 212.
70. Jennison, supra note 18, at 646 (“Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the
methodology currently known as the ‘case method’ to Harvard Law School in 1870, largely shaping
modern legal education.”).
71. Dolin, supra note 40, at 222.
72. Id. at 224 (“The Socratic-Casebook method through which law students are taught is not only
pedagogically ineffective, but is downright damaging to their mental and emotional health.”).
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and the rise of the Langdellian case method pedagogy in American law schools.
Part III will then examine the case method’s effects on modern-day students.
Finally, before the Article’s conclusion, Part IV will introduce the
instrumentality conception of law and its underlying philosophy that shifts
away from the unified and scientific paradigm of the Langdellian scientific
conception by theorizing law from fragmentation and then gathering meaning
from the human-made aspects of law’s agency. A brief exploration of what a
law classroom situated by “law as instrumentality” might look like
pedagogically will occur in Part IV as well.
II. THE GHOST SHIP OF LANGDELLIAN FORMALISM
A. Origin and Influence in Methodology
Our inquiry begins by lowering our sails in the late nineteenth century.
Especially in the last several decades of historicism, some debate has emerged
regarding the complete and total attribution of the case method to Christopher
Langdell.73 Although scholars have documented and mapped out a general
insight regarding Langdell’s law teachings, philosophy, and tenure at Harvard
Law School,74 some have suggested that much sifting and combing is still
needed but may never be completely done in terms of a comprehensive study
of the man.75 After all, the archives at Harvard house some 7,000 pages of
Langdell’s own notes, taken on loose-leaf in his illegible hand, a majority of
which remain yet to be deciphered.76 Additionally, another several thousand
pages of his papers were purposely destroyed in the 1940s, perhaps as suggested
in a reactionary fit of the legal realists, based on ideological splits from the

73. See Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography,
1906–2000s, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 296–97 (2004). Kimball notes that
[p]articularly in regard to [Langdell’s] signature teaching method, the revisionists
maintained that Langdell did not invent case method or that, if he did, then he did
not really practice it or that, if he invented and practiced it, then he really did not
understand its nature and purpose. Demonstrated by their inconsistency, the
purpose of these efforts was apparently to elevate a revered mentor, as in the case
of Beale, or the favorite son of a law school, as with Columbia or Mississippi, or
generally to demonstrate that “not literally all good things are first thought of in
Cambridge.”
Id. at 297 (quoting ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW
372 (1921)).
74. See, e.g., id. at 278.
75. See id. at 330–31.
76. Id. at 281.
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formalists.77 All in all, not unlike our knowledge of many other figures in
history, there will always be something unknowable and incomplete in our
understanding of Langdell and his contributions to modern American legal
education.78 Over the years, that gap in our conscious knowledge of Langdell
has likely supported our awe,79 our reverence,80 our vilification,81 our parody,82
and our revision of his legacy83—for whatever goals, such reactions have served

77. See id. Kimball observed that “some 3,000 papers—possibly including letters, financial
records, and lectures—were discarded in 1941” and that “this literal trashing of Langdell occurred
contemporaneously with the high tide of Holmes’s ‘hagiography.’” Id. Kimball later described the
hagiography of Holmes as a period when the legal realists interjected “a uniformly derogatory view of
Langdell” that peaked at a “high water mark” with the destruction of Langdell’s papers when the
realists dominated American legal thought. Id. at 304–05.
78. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Osler, Langdell, and the Atelier: Three Tales of Creation in
Professional Education, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 151, 185 (2013) (“[I]n the legal
profession for which he invented the signature pedagogical method, Langdell is virtually unknown.”).
79. Austen G. Fox, Professor Langdell—His Personal Influence, 20 HARV. L. REV. 7, 7–8
(1906) (eulogizing Langdell by noting that when he started teaching at Harvard students knew “that a
great teacher had come among [them] and [they] were led to seek [him] out”).
80. WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL
EDUCATION 168–70 (1994) (defending Langdell against criticisms of his contributions to legal
education and the case method).
81. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 907–08 (1933)
(painting Langdell as misguided in his practice of law and how that translated to some of his
development of the case method and why, “[d]ue to Langdell’s idiosyncracies, law school law came
to mean ‘library-law’”).
82. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 5 (1974). Gilmore famously begins his book
with a remark about the centennial development of Langdell’s work on contracts, specifically
observing that “[i]t was just a hundred years ago that Christopher Columbus Langdell, like his
namesake four centuries earlier, set sail over uncharted seas and inadvertently discovered a New
World.” Id.
83. See Kimball, supra note 73, at 311 (observing that during the mid-twentieth century, “the
scholarship on Langdell had ignored most of the evidence that would normally be considered in a
scholarly analysis of a historical figure”).

HO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

144

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

11/21/17 2:46 PM

[101:131

our purposes.84 Ultimately, however, such endeavors always fail in obtaining
a definitive truth of the matter85: we can never really know a person.86
Of course, a funny irony one might draw from all of this is a parallel
between the futility of completely getting to know a person, such as Langdell,
and the way in which Langdell’s nineteenth-century theorizing of law as
science itself—presuming law to be unified and complete in nature, formalistic
and objective in approach87—had its own futility and shortcomings as well.88
The philosophical wheels in one’s mind can readily churn away at reconciling
those observations; but whatever shortcomings and contestations exist over
fully crediting Langdell with the case method in American law schools, all
controversies step aside for the fact that such a pedagogy has defined American
law teaching for over a century’s time.89 That observation is, indeed, true, with
ample examples to bolster it.90 Arising in the 1870s, the case method was one
of the features of the new law school model in American universities, promoted
strongly by Harvard Law School through the teachings and innovations of

84. See, e.g., Jeremiah A. Ho, Function, Form, and Strawberries: Subverting Langdell, 64 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 656 (2015) (using Langdell as a counterpoint for developing active learning methods);
see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) (“[I]f Langdell had not existed,
we would have had to invent him.”); GILMORE, supra note 82, 109 n.20 (alteration in original)
(“Professor Sutherland reproduces an astonishing portrait of Langdell (‘painted . . . in the twentysecond year of [His] deanship’) which could perfectly well be a portrait of the original Christopher
Columbus.”).
85. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980S, at 55 (1983).
86. See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, Book Review, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 369 (1996) (reviewing
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) and
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL
EDUCATION (1994)). In comparing two books on Langdell, Schlegel observes how one book’s context
was “infinitely deeper” than the other’s but was still “simply not deep enough. No one’s ever is, of
course.” Id. at 372.
87. WEST, supra note 14, at 71 n.70 (noting that the Langdellian formalists believed in the
“autonomy and completeness of the common law: the common law was autonomous from all other
legal orders as well as from all other sources of authority, whether cultural or political, and it was
sufficient to answer all questions, not just most”).
88. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV.
227, 249 (2002) (“While imputing the prestige of science to law, Langdell and those in his image
simply fail to tell us exactly what the ‘legal scientist’ is doing to know law’s ‘axioms.’”)
89. Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517,
520–21 (1991).
90. See id. at 527–31 (discussing Langdell’s influence on the ideology of law as science and how
that was taught to students at Harvard); see also id. at 531 (describing Langdell’s development of the
casebook); id. at 532 (discussing Langdell’s recasting of the “professor’s role” in the classroom through
the Socratic method).
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Langdell.91 Although the use of appellate opinions in law teaching was not
necessarily new,92 the case method’s wholesale pedagogical emphasis on court
opinions was embraced as a novelty for the study of law,93 which itself was fast
becoming an academic discipline during this time.94 Summarily, the case
method’s features involve the use of appellate court cases to demonstrate
common law principles within a specific body of law.95 Its signature classroom
technique is two-fold: first, in the use of heavily-edited casebooks that contain
appellate decisions selected to authoritatively illustrate a legal principle; and
second, in the classroom use of the Socratic dialogue of inquiry-and-answer
between lecturer and students, where the lecturer would question students on
assigned case decisions and hypotheticals in order to extract significant legal
rules and principles.96
Along with the eventual rise in prominence of Harvard’s law school, the
case method—as employed by Langdell and his peers—received gradual
widespread adoption in the lecture rooms at other law schools in the country.97
At first, other competing law schools were reluctant to use the method.98
Eventually, over the twentieth century, however, the case method’s popularity
gradually gained traction and the acceptance of the method at law schools
nationwide was systemic.99 In modern-day American law schools, the
Langdellian case method, despite augmentation with the problem method and
other teaching techniques, still endures as the dominant form of instruction in
classrooms.100 Its influence in modeling and developing generations of
91. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 468 (3d ed. 2005).
92. JAMES WILLIARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 261
(1950); STEVENS, supra note 85, at 52, 66 n.14.
93. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 52–53.
94. Id. at 52.
95. Id. at 52–53.
96. PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN LAWYERS
37–50 (2003).
97. Weaver, supra note 89, at 541 n.70 (“Harvard’s status within the education community
contributed to the method’s acceptance at other schools.” (first citing Robert Maynard Hutchins, Legal
Education, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (1937); and then citing Eugene Wambaugh, Professor Langdell—A
View of His Career, 20 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1906))).
98. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 541–42 (describing how “[t]he transition began slowly” and
mentioning that, in 1894, the ABA had reported that the lecture method was still prevalent in law
instruction).
99. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 64 (observing statistically the rise in number of law schools
in the early 1900s adopting the case method); see also Jennison, supra note 18, at 646–47.
100. Weaver, supra note 89, at 543–45.
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American law faculty has been profound.101 Internationally, the case method
has its followers at law programs in other countries as well.102 And even popculturally, the case method’s notorious dialogic style of classroom teaching has
seen its most acerbic Hollywood screen variants.103
But despite being a teaching method with only two major signature
characteristics or components (the casebook and the Socratic dialogue),104 these
characteristics, in principle, underscore a larger conception of the law, one that
was both personal to Langdell and reflective of the post-Antebellum age of
American law and law schools: Langdell’s case method was grounded in the
formalist notion of law as science.105 This conception embodied an ideal of the
scientific methods applied to the study and practice of law, which Langdell
considered as a scientific entity in nature.106 The belief was that the result of
this application would lead one to discover paradigmatic legal principles within
the world and its disputes.107 Although the law-as-science conception was not
likely original to Langdell,108 his notion of law as science possessed a certain
rational empiricism that would have facilitated inquiries upon the law with
favor toward a nineteenth-century scientific methodology.109 So as science, the
101. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 544 (“At most law schools, one would have difficulty
obtaining a teaching position if during the interview process he openly stated a preference for the
lecture method. Junior faculty who consider other teaching methods may stick with the case method
for fear of retaliation in the tenure process. Although faculty are free from such restraints once tenure
is received, few alter their methods at this point. They have used the case method for many years and,
because they received tenure, they have succeeded with that method.”).
102. See, e.g., Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.-Inspired
Transplants, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60, 76 (2009) (mentioning how some law schools in China introduced
teaching approaches in the late 1990s which borrowed from U.S. law schools, including the
Langdellian case method and Socratic dialogue); see also Weaver, supra note 89, at 543 (noting that
British law schools use the case method “to varying degrees”).
103. E.g. LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001); THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. 1973).
104. See KISSAM, supra note 96, at 37.
105. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 468–69.
106. Id.
107. See Nancy Cook, Law As Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Century, 88
N.D. L. REV. 21, 22 (2012) (“The science paradigm advocated by Langdell was rooted in the accepted
wisdom of the time that the work of science was to uncover—to discover—immutable laws of
nature.”).
108. M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 95, 120 (1986).
109. Id. at 119. Hoeflich notes that Langdell’s approach “had two components: empiricism and
rationalism.” Id. In fact, such attributes added to the method’s appeal with the figures at Harvard
during Langdell’s time:
It was the empirical aspect of Langdell’s concept that was most consonant with
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law must be studied accordingly. The oft-examined quotation from the preface
of his original casebook on contract law alludes to the way Langdell conflated
his scientific conception of the law with the learning of it:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to
apply them with constant facility and certainty to the evertangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true
lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the
business of every earnest student of law. Each of these
doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in
other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through
centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a
series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only
way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the
cases in which it is embodied.110
Scholars and critics alike have linked Langdell’s conception of the law with
the other developments at Harvard Law that were auxiliary and yet consistent
to the rise of the case method in the lecture hall.111 For instance, the law
library’s development as an important and central space in the law school, akin
to the scientific laboratory, was a notable feature.112 Other developments such
as the curriculum,113 the length of a law program,114 faculty as full-time teachers

Harvard President Eliot’s and other contemporaries’ ideas about science. Science
was something that one did.
The term connoted investigation and
experimentation. Thus, Langdell argued that jurists and legal scholars were also
empirical investigators. They sought for legal principles rather than physical
rules. The sources of their raw data were not chemical compounds or heavenly
bodies, but rather legal facts, facts to be found in appellate cases. The rational
aspect of the Langdellian notion of legal science dove-tailed with the empirical
aspect. The rational aspect of the Langdellian model quite simply was the belief
that legal reasoning must be deductive.
Id. at 119–20. However, Hoeflich also notes that the deductive nature of Langdell’s paradigm reveals
how “Langdell’s notion of law as a rational science, therefore, was anything but unique or innovative.
Indeed, to a very large extent, the Langdellian concept of legal science simply echoed Mayes, Legaré,
Stewart, Leibniz, and other earlier jurists.” Id. at 120.
110. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS WITH REFERENCES
AND CITATIONS vi (1871).
111. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 466, 471–72.
112. Beatrice A. Tice, The Academic Law Library in the 21st Century: Still the Heart of the Law
School, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2011).
113. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 471–72.
114. Id. at 466.
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and scholars,115 and faculty scholarship116 all reflected this rational and
empirical scientific conception.
An illustrative way of unpacking the Langdellian ideal of law as science in
his case method is to explore the meaning and significance of its most defining
heuristic: “thinking like a lawyer.” Although the origins of this phrase is
unclear, it has characteristically tethered itself as the moniker of what American
law schools do in training lawyers; and in doing so, serves nearly as an
imprimatur of the Langdellian case method.117 Indeed, to some certain extent,
this purpose of the Langdellian law school exemplified his rationalist
assumptions about the law; if the law is science, then the primary concern of a
legal education would be to develop the legal mind—and “thinking” would
extenuate that.118 Over the years, the phrase has weathered both praise and
criticism,119 and yielded both patina and tarnish.120 Standing from a twentyfirst century vantage point, the phrase in this crisis time appears more tarnished
than gilded. Yet, a simple exegetical close-read of the phrase itself helps us
understand the Langdellian formalism for law and pedagogy that the phrase
invokes.
First, “thinking like a lawyer” reveals a scientific conception of law in how
its form appeals to the scientific inquiry of the nineteenth century.121
Alternative pedagogical conceptions of law teaching could have been “arguing
like a lawyer”—which would have emphasized rhetoric or even the concept of
“law as rhetoric.” It could have also been “practicing like a lawyer”—which
would have invariably conceived of “law as process,” or (gasp) “law as a trade,”
bringing out excessive anxiety in Langdell and many of his Brahmin peers.122
Here, however, the act of “thinking” is singled out as the sole thing that law
115. Id.
116. See Kimball, supra note 73, at 283.
117. Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like A Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive
Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 413, 419 (2007) (“Scholars are unsure
when the phrase ‘thinking like a lawyer’ first became popular, but they consistently trace the origin of
the concept to the 1870s when Dean Christopher Langdell introduced the case method and Socratic
method at Harvard Law School.”).
118. See id. (“Dean Langdell introduced this approach because he believed that law is a science
and that the scientific method could be suited for use in legal education.”).
119. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 549–51; Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s
Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 610–11 (2007).
120. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 610–11; Weaver, supra note 89, at 595, 561–62.
121. Gantt, supra note 117, at 413, 419.
122. See Eric Shimamoto, Comment, To Take Arms Against A See of Trouble: Legal Citation
and the Reassertion of Hierarchy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 443, 448 (2004) (describing the “image problem”
that law schools faced as vocational schools that was eventually fixed by Langdell’s reforms).
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schools must instill, displacing all other functions and engagements between a
lawyer and the law.123 This isolation of “thinking” is both significant and
deliberate. “Thinking,” on one hand, could have been set up here to ignore all
other things that a practicing lawyer would do; and conversely, it could also
empirically represent all the things within a Langdellian sensibility that a
practicing lawyer does—after all, one interpretation of Langdell’s notion for
“mastering” the “certain doctrines or principles” of law as science is that any
mastery begins categorically with thinking about the law.124 Either way,
“thinking like a lawyer” elevates mind over action and underscores that the
pedagogical crux in Langdell’s case method is a type of inquiry or mental
perspective that Langdell would have considered lawyerly.125
If the law is a science, then this type of inquiry would appear to be rigorous,
but also lofty, and perhaps even abstract at times. It would not be menial or
banal, but instead exists as a worthy type of thinking that, like the sciences and
empiricism, deserved a place at the university. The use of “thinking” in
“thinking like a lawyer” perhaps reflected the push for prominence of lawyers
in the post-antebellum America of the nineteenth century.126 Indeed, that is the
perception that the case method, as it was classically used in law school lecture
halls, attempts to convey as it purports to make law students think like
lawyers.127
As the examination of appellate opinions proceeds, the Socratic dialogue
between the professor and students about those case opinions attempts to
approximate what scientists would do.128 Regardless of whether that is truly
what scientists do or not, the heart of that “thinking” or inquiry in the law course
is inductive. The examination of a closed universe of cases typically assumes,
in case method fashion, a method of discovery that helps to enlighten upon
certain legal principles to be used to predict future outcomes of disputes.129
123. Rubin, supra note 119, at 651–52.
124. See LANGDELL, supra note 110, at vi.
125. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 649.
126. BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE “TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL” IN AMERICA 107–08 (1995)
(describing the law profession’s rise to prominence after the American Civil War).
127. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472.
128. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in Legal Writing: Is the Socratic Method A
Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 270 (2007) (discussing case method
as a “furtherance” of Langdellian belief in law as science and as such the method’s analytic nature).
129. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 53 (citing REED, supra note 73, at 376, 378) (“Although the
case class (and the Socratic method) were ultimately to be justified under a different rationale, their
original purpose was to isolate and analyze the relatively few principles of the common law that the
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This is typically where the inductive reasoning takes place. To glance even
more narrowly into that inductive reasoning, the case method prompts students
to render or intuit the results of cases by deciding categorically how similar or
distinct they are to previous cases.130 Moreover, there is rational, left-brain
logic in the endeavor, which adds to the abstraction. Although the facts of cases
might vary from dispute to dispute, one assumes under the Langdellian concept
of law that the legal principles that guide the direction of cases are discoverable
and unwavering and just. Put in such terms, at times, there is a dispassionate
feel to this inductive reasoning—not unlike “higher mathematics,” according to
Lawrence Friedman.131 All in all, the “thinking” in “thinking like a lawyer,” as
the case method’s use of the Socratic dialogue demonstrates, conveys the
impression of a hermetic scientific method that discounts experimentation and
experience as part of the scientific engagement, but one that favors studying
legal concepts isolated in abstraction or in a vacuum.132 This emphasizes that
the case method differentiated itself from the “text-book method” of law school
instruction that was the fashion in American law schools prior to Langdell’s
ascendancy at Harvard in the 1870s.133
Another way that the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” reflects the case
method pedagogy is in the way that the phrase case can conjure the concept of
law as Langdell and the formalists envisioned. The phrase reveals its
Langdellian conception of legal science if one asks just exactly what that lawyer
was supposed to “think” about at the inception of the case method at Harvard.
The discovery of isolated legal concepts in Langdell’s inductive case method
presumes that the inquiry leads to a complete and organic version of the
common law, devoid of contextual variables; again, this impression exemplifies
Langdell’s conception of law as science, a science that stems from universal

Harvard system postulated and to show how some (presumably non-Harvard trained) judges had
deviated from them.” (footnote omitted)).
130. WEST, supra note 14, at 50 (discussing in law schools the prevalence of teaching “[t]he
discernment of ‘likes’—the decision that this case is like that one, with which it shares some
characteristics but not others, but not fundamentally like that one, with which it also might share some
characteristics, but from which it is importantly distinguishable, and the identification of those relevant
differences and similarities”).
131. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472.
132. Id. (“[Langdell’s] model of science was not experimental, or experiential; his model was
Euclid’s geometry, not physics or biology. Langdell considered law a pure, independent science; it
was, he conceded, empirical; but the only data he allowed were reported cases. If law is at all the
product of society, then Langdell’s science of law was a geology without rocks, an astronomy without
stars. Lawyers and judges raised on the method, if they took their training at all seriously, came to
speak of law mainly in terms of a dry, arid logic, divorced from society and life.”).
133. See id. at 466–67.
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principles evolved through time.134 But the way Langdell considered the law
as science and the way he described it harbored inconsistencies on the surface.
First, he treated the law as if it was not evolving—that by sifting and culling
through cases like sediment, a universal truth of the law could be scientifically
and archeologically uncovered.135 However, he also described how such
common-law principles had evolved over time, for instance, in the way he
organized cases chronologically in his contracts casebook to show a
development.136 Perhaps in this culling between good and bad cases, the more
lawyers have thought about principles over the centuries, the more we arrived
at the truth of these legal principles. Or perhaps the law never evolved; under
a Langdellian, formalist sensibility, the law was always “there” in the natural
world of cases, pre-dating humans in some mystical organic form, and merely
waiting to be found for our judicial benefit137—or quite possibly the
inconsistencies reveal some human sleight of hand. Moreover, not only does
this idea of the completeness of the law seem stagnant, if, in whatever way, the
law has really ceased to evolve; but also in the ritualized dogmatic practice of
the case method, it would add an autopsy feel to the whole study of case law.
To Langdell, however, the completeness of the law did not indicate stagnancy;
but rather the presumption and belief that law was complete signaled its
autonomy.138 To Langdell, his observed scientific disposition of law suggested
that law existed in nature apart from man, to be discovered, to be studied, but
not to be augmented.139 Thus, it is tempting to make the metaphoric analogy
that Langdell’s case method was like the attempt to find a natural resource, and
once found, its application to existing and future legal problems was
unadulterated. In describing the importance of the law library, Langdell’s own
words seem to allude to this:
We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the library is
the proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is
134. See id. at 473 (“The unity of some parts of the common law was a fact. Langdell’s
abstractions, however, ignored the nature of law as a living system, rooted in time, place, and
circumstance.”).
135. Id. at 472.
136. Id. at 469.
137. See Hoeflich, supra note 108, at 120.
138. Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the
Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 621, 627 (2001) (noting that under Langdell’s conception
of law was a direction toward “the way of law’s autonomy” and that “[l]aw, from this perspective, is
an island complete unto itself”).
139. See Hoeflich, supra note 108, at 120.
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to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the
chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to the
zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.140
The law library was the laboratory and to find the law, we would go to its
printed books.141 So there, law was a science.
An important hidden assumption of Langdell’s conception of the law was
its perceived perfection. Buttressed by then-current values of objectivity and
empiricism in the sciences, Langdell conceived of the law as “objective” and
perfect as well.142 Of course, in this way, like the sciences, law deserved a place
for true academic prestige and study at the university, away from the
connotations of previous incarnations of American law schools that emphasized
rote-memory and daily recitations on the law.143 The features of the
Langdellian casebook exemplify this peculiar conception of law as this unique
academic science. The original casebooks assembled and used at Harvard
during Langdell’s tenure were merely a collection of cases, without notes, and
devoid of social or political contexts.144 The cases reflected the English
common law tradition; for instance, most of the cases in Langdell’s contracts
casebook were English cases while American cases were fewer and mostly
from New York and Massachusetts courts.145 Of course, questions of true
objectivity would arise to challenge Langdell’s assumptions in the canonical
assembling of these cases for instruction, if they were to exemplify the perfect
unity of the common law. But for Langdell, the dogma of the common law
would allow him to ignore that point; after all, even in the preface of his
casebook, he defended his selection of cases by pointing to “good” and “bad”
cases:
[T]he cases which are useful and necessary for this purpose [of
study] at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion
to all that have been reported. The vast majority are useless
and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study.
Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much
less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in
which the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance,
140. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches (November 5, 1886), in 3
LAW Q. REV., Jan. 1887, at 123–24.
141. See id.
142. See Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and
Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 360 (1995).
143. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 54, 61–63.
144. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 469, 482.
145. Id. at 469.
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and the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of
each other, being the cause of much misapprehension.146
There is an almost Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest feeling here—as
Langdell described the process of collecting these artifact cases in his book.147
And it was Darwin’s scientific theory that promoted a sense of objectivity.148
Like species being guided by an invisible hand toward survival in evolutionary
biology, the “fittest” cases and legal principles survived in Langdell’s world of
legal science to be refined by thinking academically about them.149 Other than
the inclusion of good cases and the exclusion of bad ones, the process of finding
such good cases in Langdell’s contracts casebook were divided and arranged
topically, with cases in each topic presented in chronology, “showing an
evolution of principles from darkness to light.”150 Moreover, no statutes were
included in his casebook.151 With the casebook, students were to distill or find
the legal principles contained in such cases and believe that such principles
were fixed and able to resolve future cases.152 Thus, the form of the Langdellian
casebook was mimetic of Langdell’s creed about the common law as science.
The casebook was both self-contained and empirical in presentation, hermetic
unto itself and steeped strictly in a near-exegetical tradition of the common
law.153 All of these features of an untouchable perfection were the envisioned
law to be “thought about” in “thinking like a lawyer.”
The more one examines the Langdellian case method in this partially
destabilized and critical fashion, the more apparent that Langdell’s conception
of “law as science” had some of the spirit of what law is—especially as
embodied within the English common law tradition of law—but the conception

146. LANGDELL, supra note 110, at vi–vii.
147. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 55 (describing that the case method “was ‘scientific,’
practical, and somewhat Darwinian” and that “it managed to create an aura of the survival of the
fittest”).
148. Id. (“[The case method] was based on the assumption of a unitary, principled system of
objective doctrines that seemed or were made to seem to provide consistent responses.”).
149. See Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of AntiFormalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 29 (1980) (“Langdell’s return to original
sources—the cases, his activization of the classroom, and his preference for principles over maxims
parallel nineteenth-century empiricist and evolutionist thinking.”).
150. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 469.
151. Id.
152. Weaver, supra note 89, at 528–29.
153. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472, 482.

HO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

154

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

11/21/17 2:46 PM

[101:131

at times was also heavily and ironically artificial.154 The exclusion of certain
cases in his teachings, cases of “local diversity” for instance, over English
canonical cases, was motivated by aspirations of elevating legal studies as a
unitary science across the United States.155 Accordingly, in assuming authority
by presiding over the pedagogy and teaching methodology at Harvard in the
1870s, Langdell was able to elevate himself and his formalist conception; in
Lawrence Friedman’s words “[t]here was only one common law; Langdell was
its prophet. . . . Oceans could not sever the unity of common law; it was one
and indivisible . . . .”156 First was the sense of intellectual hierarchy that
perpetuated itself; the common law was elevated and Langdell along with it.157
Others have elaborated more functionally about Langdell’s sleight of hand,
describing the results of situating himself at the head of this brand of formalism:
“Langdell, the interpreter of the law, never let the reader know that it was he,
rather than the ‘law,’ that created the discourse and conducted the analysis.”158
Langdell’s conception reinforced a way to speak about the law that was
detached from the subject in its formalism.159 Rather, perceiving law as science
led to viewing and dissecting law in assumptions of completeness and in
isolating abstraction.160 As a result, this formalist way of viewing the law bears
a “hidden assumption of the autonomous [legal] subject,” which is theoretically
problematic.161 Langdell’s formalism “proceeded as if law itself was speaking
to the reader and hence capable of creating its own meaning. ‘The law, like a
subject, [did] things; doctrines [became] subjects, and [did] things to each
other.’”162 That view was what law’s complete autonomy implied and was
created by “the objectification of law” where “legal rules are explained,
analyzed, and criticized as if they were transcendental objects unaffected by
analyzing subjects.”163 In both method and content, Langdell’s “law as science”
fetishized ways to view the law in perfected form and ignored “inconsistences”
for an idealized perfection cast as scientific objectivity—even though it could
154. See id. at 469–73.
155. Id. at 472.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Minda, supra note 142, at 381 (citing Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1991)).
159. See id. at 360.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 381. “Once the subject is revealed and articulated, legal scholars are confronted with
a serious predicament.” Id. at 382.
162. Id. at 381 (alterations in original) (quoting David S. Caudill, Pierre Schlag’s “The Problem
with the Subject”: Law’s Need for an Analyst, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 711 (1993)).
163. Id. (using Langdell’s contract case book as an example).
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not have been truly objective or scientific if one had to discover the law by
looking selectively backward in time in “printed books.”164 Moreover,
Langdell’s “law as science” was a science that ignored experimentation and
context.165 It left the lawyer as an observer, detached from law’s evolution
because the common law was no longer assumed to be evolving. Accordingly,
law was to be written about “in the passive voice” and to be “rigorously
maintain[ed in] the detached demeanor of a scientist conducting a controlled
experiment.”166 No subject existed, apart from the law itself, in the legal
principles drawn from the opinions that Langdell and his students examined in
Harvard law courses—despite these opinion’s judicial authorships. Langdell’s
own theory of the law—his own peculiar science—and methodology reveals
that he was more or less an exegete.167 The law was perfect—or perfected in
abstraction—and as a lawyer, one could only think within the restrictions of
that perfection, not beyond.
That was the dogma of Langdell’s legal science. His conception of law was
taught and perpetuated through its case method dissection of common law cases
to students at Harvard and then nationally thereafter. After World War I,
numerous American law schools began to emerge, replicating the case method
as American legal education’s conspicuous pedagogy in lecture halls
throughout the United States.168 Accordingly, generations of American law

164. See Wai Chee Dimock, Rules of Law, Laws of Science, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 203, 209–
10 (2001) (“Langdell’s scientific knowledge seems to have been quite perfunctory, oblivious not only
to the historical challenge of science but also to the new developments taking place in the very century
in which he was writing.”).
165. Minda, supra note 142, at 381 (citing Schlag, supra note 158, at 1632–62) (“In Langdell’s
contract casebook, for example, law is a transcendental object unaffected by social and economic
context.”)); id. (“[A] debtor becomes personally bound to his creditor for the payment of the debt . . . .”
(alterations in original) (quoting Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisprudence, 1 HARV. L. REV.
55, 68 (1887))); id. (“The debtor and the creditor are unnamed individuals who are the legal
abstractions of Langdell’s analysis of commercial law.”).
166. Id. at 380.
167. Kunal M. Parker, Representing Interdisciplinarity, 60 VILL. L. REV. 561, 563 (2015)
(“‘Langdell’s legal science’ was ‘gendered and classed and raced, depending for its authority on
removing contestation, the voices of others, from the text and hermeneutics of the law.’ Most law
professors were male and thoroughly schooled in Langdellian science; they had no experience with
rhetoric or history and therefore reinforced the Langdellian idea that law is doctrine.” (footnote
omitted) (quoting Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility
of Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 516–17 (2002))).
168. Stephen R. Alton, Roll over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief History of American
Legal Education, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 339, 349–50 (2010).
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students have “thought like lawyers” and objectified the law under Langdell’s
conception of legal science.169
B. The Neglect of Realism
While the widespread use of the Langdellian case method was solidifying
in American law schools in the 1920s and 1930s, legal realism came to
dominate American legal thought.170 An earlier version of realism co-existed
with the Langdellian formalists during the late nineteenth century, with Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., as one of its inspirational founding patriarchs.171 Holmes,
who taught at Langdell’s Harvard during the 1870s, withheld the beliefs of
formalism and did not share Langdell’s concept that the common law was
unified and complete.172 Rather, Holmes’s concept of the common law
embraced a “pragmatic historicism,” which relied on “experience as an
objective source of knowledge.”173 History has paired Langdell and Holmes
against each other, but the rise of their respective schools of legal thought was
not simultaneous. As Stephen Feldman has described, the realists followed the
formalists in the period of legal modernism in American law, with Holmes’s
ideas joined subsequently by the writings of Roscoe Pound and Benjamin
Cardozo, and even later by the likes of Jerome Frank, Felix Cohen, and Karl
Llewellyn.174
The realists assailed against Langdell’s formalist conception of law as
science.
Pound famously called Langdell’s formalism “mechanical
jurisprudence.”175 On the whole, the realists “denounced the abstract and
decontextualized rationalism of Langdellian legal science as unrelated to
meaningful social reality, unrelated to human experiences of the external
world.”176 They pointed out the fallacy of Langdell’s scientific objectivity:
“Whereas Langdellian scholars claimed that their abstract reasoning enabled
them to discover objective legal truths—the rules and principles of the common
law—realists such as Felix Cohen belittled the Langdellian rules and principles

169. See id. at 351.
170. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 108–09 (2000).
171. See Kimball, supra note 73, at 304–05.
172. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 108.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 108–11.
175. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908).
176. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 110.
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as ‘transcendental nonsense.’”177 The realist movement took dominance of the
high seas of American legal thought away from the Langdellian formalists, but
from within the movement itself, there was a spectrum of disparity amongst its
prominent thinkers.178 Still, the realist reaction against the Langdellian notion
of unity and objectivity of law as science was undeniable.179 Ultimately, what
the realists offered as a response to Langdellian formalism was to “cause[] the
predicative value of doctrine to be seriously questioned.”180 They questioned
and torpedoed Langdell’s objectivity until that objectivity was substantially
submerged.181
The realists did not exempt Langdellian innovations of the American law
school from scrutiny.182 Jerome Frank famously made his views known that
“[t]he law student should learn, while in school, the art of legal practice. And
to that end, the law schools should boldly, not slyly and evasively, repudiate
the false dogmas of Langdell.”183 In a more hypothesized tone, Karl Llewellyn
later expressed his views about the Langdellian dependence on appellate cases
177. Id. at 110–11. Feldman uses an example from Felix Cohen to further elaborate the realist
philosophical differences:
For instance, to determine whether a court has jurisdiction over a corporation, a
Langdellian would ask, “Where is the corporation?” The Langdellian then
ostensibly would turn to abstract rules and principles to resolve this question—
concluding, let’s say, that the corporation is in New York. But Cohen argued that
despite the Langdellians’ pretensions, their rules and principles would not
produce a determinative outcome in this case. “Clearly the question of where a
corporation is, when it incorporates in one state and has agents transacting
corporate business in another state, is not a question that can be answered by
empirical observation,” Cohen wrote. “It is in fact, a question identical in
metaphysical status with the question . . . ‘How many angels can stand on a point
of a needle?’”
Id. at 111 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1935)).
178. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 156 (“The Realist ‘movement’ thus gave the impression of
being more firmly established than in fact it was. The distance between [Jerome] Frank at his most
extreme and [Karl] Llewellyn at his most constructive could not have been greater.”).
179. Id. (“The major contribution of the Realist movement was to kill the Langdellian notion of
law as an exact science, based on the objectivity of the black-letter rules. When it became acceptable
to write about the law as it actually operated, legal rules could no longer be assumed to be value-free.”).
180. Id.
181. See id. (“The Realists went a long way toward killing the idea of ‘the system’ altogether.
All legal logic came under suspicion.”).
182. Id. (“[T]he value of [the Realists’] capacity to question accepted tenets of law and legal
education cannot be denied.”).
183. Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 723, 726 (1933).
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by contrasting it with the case approach used in business schools: “Consider,
for example, the possibility of building up our so-called cases out beyond the
judicial opinion into something resembling the completeness of the cases
gathered for the Harvard Business School.”184 In their own respective right,
Frank and Llewellyn, as realists, both beckoned for the kind of practical training
for lawyers that steered beyond Langdell’s case method.185 Yet, the questioning
fell short of leading to deep and comprehensive changes in existing Langdellian
legal pedagogy: “The criticism of the case method came under fire in the 1920s
and 1930s from legal scholars of the Legal Realist movement, even while it
continued as part of American law school training.”186 There were, of course,
some noticeable modifications: the inclusion of clinical legal education and the
contextualization of social sciences into the law school curriculum with new
courses that were interdisciplinary.187 But heavy dependence on appellate
opinions in law school classes persisted.188 The Socratic dialogue continued to
be employed in lectures.189 In spite of adding supporting materials alongside
cases in the law casebook,190 the core of the text was still comprised of topical
collections of appellate case opinions. Accordingly, “[d]espite the realist
critique, the use of the case method as a pedagogical tool for developing
exacting analyses of a legal problem continued to be used throughout the
twentieth century and remains a part of law school instruction.”191
Some irony exists in this neglect, particularly when one notes how the
realists dominated over the American legal academy in the early decades of the
twentieth century. One would have believed that the realists’ disagreement
with Langdell would have prompted some significant changes to Langdell’s
case method pedagogy in American law teaching. But at the core of realism, if
the law was not Langdell’s Darwinian notion of science any longer, the law had
become a social science. Perhaps this transition was why law schools continued
184. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215
(1948).
185. See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical
Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 587–89 (1987).
186. Susan Katcher, Legal Training in the United States: A Brief History, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J.
335, 367 (2006).
187. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 158–60.
188. Katcher, supra note 186, at 368.
189. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 157.
190. GILMORE, supra note 84, at 88 (“What were called non-legal materials . . . became ‘Cases
and Materials’ to indicate that studying law no longer meant studying cases which, according to
Langdell, were our ‘experimental materials.’”).
191. Katcher, supra note 186, at 368 (citing I THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 24 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999)).
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to use the case method long after the age of American legal realism, even when
other movements of legal thought emerged such as legal process in the 1950s,192
and then in the 1970s and thereafter, schools such as law and economics, critical
legal studies, feminist legal theory, law and literature, and critical race theory.193
With the realists, law was not science, but social science.194 This
conception embedded itself in the case method pedagogy, creating a neat
retrofit to Langdell’s case method rather than a wholesale move to another
entirely new instructional practice. According to Friedman, “Langdell’s system
was repackaged as a superior kind of skills training; . . . the method taught the
student how to ‘think like a lawyer.’ This meant mastering the law school brand
of mental acrobatics, along with the fine art of argument . . . .”195 Perhaps this
lack of change reflects the limitation of realist conceptions of law from being
totally and completely different from formalism. In any event, as a result of
this retrofit, the objectification of law that had underscored the practice of
Langdell’s case method remained in some shape in later case method usage in
law schools.196 Even past the last century, whether advertently or not,
professors have instilled that objectification to students in their law classes,
even though legal theorists no longer subscribe to Langdellian conceptions.197
The form of the case method, as used in American law schools today, replicates
the ceremony of objectification, even if law as science has been replaced by
something else.198 The examination of law through the indoctrinated rituals of
professorial questioning-and-answering, the perceived primacy of appellate
case decisions, and the same line-up of subject courses in the first-year
curriculum since Langdell’s Harvard days suggest that, devoid of the
Langdellian scientific perspective of law, the remnant form of Langdell’s
methodology might still be steering students and scholars toward a similar type
of regard for the law.199 And all of this continuance of the case method has
been the status quo for decades.200 In terms of pedagogy then, what American

192. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 120 (describing the rise of the legal process school in the
1950s).
193. See Minda, supra note 142, at 367.
194. See Alton, supra note 168, at 356 (citing GILMORE, supra note 84, at 87). Alton further
states that, thanks to the realists, we also see law as an art. Id. at 358.
195. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 36 (2002).
196. See id.
197. See Minda, supra note 142, at 380–83.
198. See id.
199. WEST, supra note 14, at 43–48 (noting that law schools teach a “moral relativism”).
200. Id. at 46.
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law schools have been sailing on since the legal realists is the ghost ship of
Langdell.
In an existential observation about American law schools in the postRecession crisis, Robin West has suggested the cause and implications of the
hesitancy to move beyond Langdell’s case method, despite modern rejections
of Langdell’s conception of law:
Contemporary law students are receiving the benefit of a
belated recognition that in his desire to separate the study of
law from the study of society Langdell was spectacularly
wrong: law is not autonomous from other cultural, economic,
historical, and philosophical forces, and should not be studied
as such. Today’s law students are the better for it; they have a
more realistic, as well as far richer, understanding of law as a
consequence than did their counterparts in Langdell’s
classrooms.
Nevertheless, the added sophistication that comes from
interdisciplinarity does not in any obvious or automatic way
contribute to the articulation of what a lawyer is or should be,
or what education a student should have to become one. It does
not, that is, fill the gap left by our rejection of the Langdellian
understanding of the lawyer as a member of a learned
profession immersed in the study of the common law. We
simply have not articulated such a post-Langdellian
conception, and all the interdisciplinary studies in the world on
the nature of law, rather than lawyering, will not imply one: we
will not have one, that is, until we have a faculty committed to
producing one, and acting on it.201
West attributes the cause of this hesitancy to jump ship to some other vessel
of teaching to a lack of faculty perspective collectively on the teaching of law
students—a missing “post-Langdellian conception”202—and not an academic
perspective of law’s nature, which as West criticizes is what students receive
from modern law courses.203 The implication of hanging on to the traditions
and practices of law teaching is how inappropriate or effective the current

201. Id. at 154–55.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 155 (“Students learn law today not from the rarified perspective of the appellate
lawyer, but rather, increasingly, from an academic perspective that is immersed in some aspect of the
legal system but for essentially nonprofessional reasons, or from clinicians immersed in practice, but
not from an idealized or particularly critical perspective.”).
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conception is for training lawyers.204 In other instances, West has identified in
her own words how the use of the case method leads to problematic
objectifications of law, illustrating how the propagation of Langdell’s case
method leads to legalism that distracts from serious engagement with the idea
that law can further justice.205 Her arguments on whether or not law ought to
further justice and how such notions should be taught to law students buttress
her own specialized imperative that law schools must move toward a postLangdellian conception.206 Nevertheless, she is correct to diagnose that a postLangdellian conception is amiss in legal education even though more than a
century of American legal history has passed since the decline of Langdell’s
concept of law as science.
Others have concurred with West.207 Part III will examine more
implications of this incongruity between American legal pedagogy and history.
III. THE CASE METHOD & OBJECTIFICATION OF THE LAW
In observing the historical movements of American jurisprudence, one need
not search far and wide for criticisms that the nature of the law is ever slowmoving in comparison to advances in social reality. Such criticisms emerge
rather easily after a cursory search. Whether scholarly observations of lag and
sluggishness have been used to describe progress of certain bodies of law208 or
the entirety of jurisprudence itself,209 one consensus is that “the legal system
was peculiarly slow to reflect changes in the larger culture, partly because of
the specialized nature of the legal profession and partly because of the
investment of professionals in the status quo.”210 Similarly, as law’s
derivatives, the legal profession and legal education both embody comparable
rhythms toward progress.211 Like progress in law, “[a]dmittedly, change often
204. Id. at 154–55 (“Nevertheless, the added sophistication that comes from interdisciplinarity
does not in any obvious or automatic way contribute to the articulation of what a lawyer is or should
be, or what education a student should have to become one.”).
205. Id. at 51, 57–59.
206. Id. at 66.
207. See Alton, supra note 168, at 363.
208. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 418 (2015)
(remarking how “[c]hange in property law is slow”).
209. See, e.g., Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 70 (2006).
210. G. Edmund White, Transforming History in the Postmodern Era, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1315,
1323 n.21 (1993) (citing Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967)).
211. See Alton, supra note 168, at 361–62.
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comes rather slowly to legal education; after all, the law has always tended to
be a backward-looking profession.”212 Resistance is more often the norm. 213
Conflated together, all of these remarks about the behavior of law and lawyers
prompts one to ask in the context of the legal profession whether lawyers as
pessimists tend to persist in orthodoxy more than they would if they were more
collectively optimists.
At first, Langdell’s reforms at Harvard Law School were not exempt from
resisters.214 Early in his period of pedagogical innovations at Harvard, the
introduction and use of the case method in the classroom met some staunch
reluctance from both legal educators and the bar alike.215 The account in The
Centennial History of Harvard Law School, which attributed the case method
to Langdell, recounted that “[t]o most of the students, as well as to Langdell’s
colleagues, [the case method] was [an] abomination.”216 More specifically,
[h]is attempts were met with the open hostility, if not of the
other instructors, certainly of the bulk of the students. His first
lectures were followed by impromptu indignation meetings—
“What do we care whether Myers agrees with the case, or what
Fessenden thinks of the dissenting opinion? What we want to
know is: ‘What’s the law?’” 217
The contemporary bar had its harsh skepticisms: “Practitioners had always
had some doubts about the case method, both intellectually and politically. As
early as 1876 the Central Law Journal had condemned the system ‘which we
understand to involve a wide and somewhat indiscriminate reading of cases—
some of them overruled.’”218 The editors of the Central Law Journal had
expressly disclaimed any approval of the case method.219 They also noted how
212. Id. at 361.
213. See, e.g., JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 13 (1914) (“Opposition to innovation is deeply rooted in human nature.”);
see also White, supra note 210, 1323 n.21. White points out that conversely to a steady adherence to
status quo due to investment, there is threat to ideology that holds people back and impinges change;
in other words, there is “the phenomenon of limits on the capacity of humans to embrace certain data
within their consciousness—the ‘imprisoning’ features of ideology. Changes in the larger culture may
not be perceived by legal actors, given their consciousness, as ‘changes’ at all.” Id.
214. HARVARD LAW SCH. ASS’N, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL:
1817–1917, at 35 (1918).
215. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 58.
216. HARVARD LAW SCH. ASS’N, supra note 214, at 35.
217. Id.
218. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 57 (quoting The Higher Legal Education, 3 CENT. L.J. 539, 540
(1876)).
219. The Higher Legal Education, supra note 218, at 540 (“We do not wish to be understood as
approving the system of teaching law introduced by Prof. Langdell . . . .”).
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the rise of the case method pedagogy had “excited great and bitter controversy”
that led to the establishment of the law school at Boston University.220 The
allusion to a certain underlying concern or fear for how the profession might be
perceived seemed to lurk beneath the surface of the Journal’s observations:
The strength of our impressions is that the reading of carefully
selected judgments of the courts, could, in a course of legal
study, profitably be made subsidiary to the attending of
lectures and the study of approved textbooks; but we doubt the
wisdom of relying on case-reading to the extent to which, as
we understand it, Prof. Langdell’s system goes.221
This possible prediction that the law would be subjugated resembles the
tension against the trade night-school law schools that sprang in the early
twentieth century to accommodate ethnic minorities who wanted to attend law
schools and enter into the profession but were more or less excluded from the
learned classes at law schools such as Harvard.222 It seemed more politically
motivated than accurate. In fact, the trade school model was inconsistent with
Langdell’s intentions for starting the use of the case method at Harvard; he had
intended the case method to elevate the legal studies, not automatize it.223
True to effect, however, the journal editors got it right that students would
skip his classes. In the first term of introducing the case method, Langdell’s
“students were bewildered; they cut Langdell’s classes in droves; only a few
remained to hear him out.”224 By the end, the class was left to seven students—
devotees who were then known as “Kit’s Freshmen” or “Langdell’s
Freshman.”225 But students did not leave because they thought they could wing
the learning of critical lawyering skills on their own.226 More likely Langdell’s

220. Id.; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 470 (“The Boston University Law School was
founded in 1872 as an alternative to Harvard’s insanity.”).
221. The Higher Legal Education, supra note 218, at 540.
222. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 39–40, 49 n.49, 100–02.
223. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472. Friedman recounts that “Langdell’s proudest boast was
that law was a science, and that his method was highly scientific.” Id. The scientific attributes ascribed
to his method played into the tension of perceptions that legal education was either vocational or
rigorous scholarly training. In fact, within the history of American legal training, “[a] principle of
vocational training struggled against a principle of scientific training.” Id. In this way, “Langdell’s
new method was antivocational.” Id.
224. Id. at 470.
225. Id.
226. See id.
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students left because they could not find the relevance of what Langdell taught
through his case method—“overruled” decisions.
Inadvertently or otherwise, Joseph Beale echoed this irrelevancy when he
recounted that Langdell’s law “sometimes seemed too academic; and many of
his students said, if they did not really feel, that his teaching was magnificent,
but it was not law”227—particularly as Langdell called English cases by Lord
Hardwick “comparatively recent” and “was believed to regard modern
decisions as beneath his notice.”228 The peculiar academic nature of Langdell’s
classroom teaching proved to be pedantic: “The dialogues in Langdell’s classes
went slowly, and covered very little ground, compared to the lecture
method.”229 As an immediate reaction, colleagues at Harvard returned to their
previous methods of law teaching.230
Of course, eventually, the case method became the status quo that the legal
academy heavily invested in.231 In 1906, James Ames, dean of Harvard Law
School from 1895 to 1910, and who has received some attribution regarding the
popularizing of the case method, remarked that
the most fruitful change of all was the revolution effected by
Langdell in the mode of teaching and studying law,—a
revolution now so complete that most persons hear with
surprise that, when his ‘Cases on Contracts,’ was first used, his
disciples were a mere handful and known as ‘Langdell’s
freshmen,’ a name given as a term of reproach but received as
a title of honor.232
Ames had been one of those seven freshmen.233 Perhaps this artifact was truly
why Ames was hyperbolic in sentiment when he paid Langdell his tributes in
1906, upon Langdell’s death, by saying that “[i]n the last ten years [Langdell’s]

227. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Professor Langdell—His Later Teaching Days, 20 HARV. L. REV. 9,
10 (1906).
228. Id.
229. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 470.
230. Id. It is also interesting to note that a decade after the case method was instilled at Harvard,
“Langdell’s personal mode of teaching changed. With his eyesight rapidly deteriorating, he gave up
Socratic questioning and began to lecture, imparting his own analysis of the cases that students were
assigned to read.” Kimball, supra note 73, at 294 (first citing Beale, supra note 227, at 9; and then
citing Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redlich Report, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV.
91, 106–07 (1916)).
231. James Barr Ames, Professor Langdell—His Services to Legal Education, 20 HARV. L. REV.
12, 13 (1906).
232. Id.
233. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 470.
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method has conquered its way into a majority of American law schools”234 and
that “it is a constant satisfaction that this man of genius was permitted to see
his views dominating legal education throughout the United States.”235 But in
terms of the case method, “the leading universities had ‘received the faith’ by
1891,”236 and “[u]ltimately, every major and most minor law schools converted
to case-books and the Socratic method.”237 In large part, the method’s success
was due to a gradual ability for law schools aspiring for prominence in the
university setting to use it to reflect conformance to a growing elitist trend that
had started at Harvard.238
To be sure, some have observed positive attributes and consequences for
using the case method. There were financial benefits and efficiencies. As
Robert Stevens has observed, “[t]he vast success of Langdell’s method enabled
the establishment of a large-size class.”239 Specifically, under Langdell’s
deanship at Harvard, the case method allowed a class of 75 students to be led
by one faculty member: “Its Socratic aspect justified the abandonment of the
recitation and the quiz, the ‘exercises’ used at good schools relying on the
lecture method.”240 The economics established by this new faculty-student
ratio meant less expensive courses to run at Harvard; indeed, “[a]ny educational
program or innovation that allowed one man to teach even more students was
not unwelcome to university administrators. The ‘Harvard method of
instruction’ meant that law schools could be self-supporting.”241 This selfsubstance seemed attractive to law schools.
In terms of pedagogical benefits, others have identified them in the case
method as well. Approached by the Carnegie Foundation in 1913 to evaluate
234. Ames, supra note 231, at 13.
235. Id.; see Kimball, supra note 73, at 293–94 (discussing the “revisionist” nature of the tributes
to Langdell in 1906, following his death, especially in contrast to Ames’ works as dean of Harvard that
maintained Langdell’s legacy).
236. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 57.
237. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 471.
238. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 63. Stevens notes that the case method succeeded because of
institutional elitism and the race to achieve academic status: “No doubt part of the method’s popularity
was snobbism; once elite law schools had decided to approve of the system, those aspiring to be
considered elite rapidly followed.” Id.; see also id. at 60–63 (narrating the “Harvardiz[ing]” of law
schools at various American universities such as Columbia, Northwestern, Chicago, Cincinnati,
Wisconsin, Hastings, Yale, and Valparaiso).
239. Id. at 63.
240. Id.
241. Id. (citation omitted).
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the case method in American law schools, German law professor, Josef
Redlich,242 wrote in his resulting report that the case method was more
analytically demanding for the law student over the older textbook method:
Consequently as the [case] method was developed, it laid the
main emphasis upon precisely that aspect of the training which
the older text-book school entirely neglected: the training of
the student in intellectual independence, in individual thinking,
in digging out the principles through penetrating analysis of the
material found within separate cases: material which contains,
all mixed in with one another, both the facts, as life creates
them, which generate the law, and at the same time rules of the
law itself, component parts of the general system. In the fact
that, as has been said before, it has actually accomplished this
purpose, lies the great success of the case method.243
Redlich also qualified his praise by noting his hesitancy with the case
method’s embodiments of a scientific conception of law, calling the heavy
analogy between law and science “inaccurate”244—and by regarding the nature
of American law, as driven by common law practices, to have buoyed the case
method’s success.245
On similar evaluations of praise as Redlich, others have dived further into
observations of the case method’s analytical demand. Paul Carrington offered
a catalogue of benefits that observed the case method’s capability to foster
mental discipline and independent habits of learning the law;246 its development
of lawyerly judgment;247 its helpful comprehension of common law
242. Kimball, supra note 73, at 290.
243. REDLICH, supra note 213, at 39.
244. Id. at 55. In his view, Redlich found that “the analogy between legal science and physical
science so frequently drawn by modern American lawyers in their discussions of method is, in
everything that concerns nature and method, itself inaccurate.” Id. This had implications for the case
method’s “unqualified rejection of the lecture from the curriculum of the university law schools, and
the extraordinary slighting of literary aids to the study of law,” as it “seems an error and a prejudice
which has its origin in an undoubted exaggeration of the value of the analytic method in and for itself;
and possibly also in an exaggeration of the value in scientific instruction of ‘method’ in general.” Id.
at 54; see also id. at 55 (“Prominent though experimental and inductive methods are in the sciences
which serve physical research, we press a generalization much too far when we make of the inductive
method the sole criterion of scientific intellectual activity.”).
245. Id. at 35 (“I said, further, that the fundamental reason for [the case method’s] success is to
be found in the present condition of American law, and within this especially in the unshaken authority
of the common law. Unchecked by the voluminous output of statutory law, in all conceivable fields
of law and in all the states of the Union, the law of America has still remained, above all things,
common law.”).
246. Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691, 745–46 (1995).
247. Id. at 747.
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traditions;248 its promotion of moral consciousness;249 and its narrative power
to draw attention.250 In commenting about Carrington’s indicated list of
benefits, Judith Welch Wegner has questioned “whether these benefits are
directly attributable to the ‘case method’ or to the use of the ‘Socratic method’
of questioning in conjunction with the study of cases.”251 Regardless of this
distinction, Welch then considered that “other benefits might be added” to
Carrington’s list:
the potential for development of “deep knowledge,” the chance
to participate in the “construction” of knowledge that fosters
memory and self-confidence, the opportunity to teach about the
legal process and lawyering as well as about how to read cases
and engage in critical analysis, the power of learning in an
authentic context that resembles at least to some degree the
actual practice setting, and the educational force of gaining
certainty in the face of pre-existing doubt.252
In likewise fashion, Russell Weaver has also noted how the heavy emphasis
of cases factually contextualizes the legal situations for students and can
“stimulate greater student interest” than reading summaries of legal issues from
a textbook.253 Similar to Carrington, Weaver also noted how the case method
teaches students how to dissect the different parts of a case opinion,254 facilitates
learning of critical analysis by compelling in-class inquiry into cases,255
develops mental “toughness” and quick thinking skills,256 allows learning law
in a precedent-driven system,257 imparts comprehension of a legal process that
is inductive,258 and instructs upon the functions of a lawyer.259 Others have

248. Id. at 749–54.
249. Id. at 754–59.
250. Id. at 746.
251. Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked Problems,” 61 RUTGERS L.
REV. 867, 927 (2009).
252. Id.
253. Weaver, supra note 89, at 547–48; see also David D. Garner, Comment, The Continuing
Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty-First Century, 2000 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 307, 328 (2000).
254. Weaver, supra note 89, at 549.
255. Id. at 549–52.
256. Id. at 552–53.
257. Id. at 553.
258. Id. at 553–57.
259. Id. at 558–61.

HO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

168

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

11/21/17 2:46 PM

[101:131

echoed Carrington, Welch, and Weaver’s emphases that the case method
promotes critical and intellectual rigor.260
Of course, opposing views about the method also exist—and in plenty of
forms. Specific criticisms, particularly from law faculty, over the pedagogical
side effects of Langdell’s case method have always persisted—criticisms that
echo the contemporary scrutiny of the method during Langdell’s days at
Harvard, but also ones that dip deeper into its murky waters to uncover more of
its shortcomings and treachery. Never mind Jerome Frank’s unflattering
criticisms about the case method in the 1930s, which asserted inter alia, that
under the case method, students “do not study cases” truly as the method had
claimed;261 that “[s]tudents trained under the Langdell system are like future
horticulturists confining their studies to cut flowers”;262 and that the method’s
most profound “fault is in its naive assumption of the inviolability of the stare
decisis doctrine and its corollaries.”263 Or one could forgo for now, Grant
Gilmore’s later acerbic indictments in the 1970s, which noted that “[a]t least in
Langdell’s version, [the case method] had nothing whatever to do with getting
students to think for themselves; it was, on the contrary, a method of
indoctrination through brainwashing.”264 In tone, both Frank and Gilmore’s
twentieth-century remarks seemed to rail against the widespread acceptance of
the case method, trying to arouse mutiny in the academy by flinging contempt
for Langdell and his method into the air. And according to John Schlegel’s
passing quip, uncovered in Bruce Kimball’s relatively recent historiography on
Christopher Langdell, Grant Gilmore might have succeeded.265 But aside from
Frank, Gilmore, and the trashing of the Langdellian method for the sake of
mutiny (or even just the sake of trashing it), the crux of some of the negative
insights toward the Langdellian case method points to its categorical failing to
teach law in its entirety—that the pedagogy is propped with the purpose to

260. See Garner, supra note 253, at 328–29 (asserting that the case method makes students selfsufficient and teaches about the law’s complexity).
261. Frank, supra note 81, at 910.
262. Id. at 912.
263. Id. It could be worse: “They resemble prospective dog breeders who never see anything
but stuffed dogs.” Id.
264. GILMORE, supra note 82, at 13.
265. See Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They
Are Not to Take As Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C.
C. Langdell, 1870–1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57, 60 (1999) (noting that John Henry Schlegel’s
mentioning some of the reverent considerations for Langdell’s “golden age” for American law teaching
might have ended when Grant Gilmore “started several of us off trashing it” (quoting Schlegel, supra
note 86, at 369)).
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accomplish too much, and as a result, has assumed too much.266 Redlich
alluded to this problem when he wrote that a result of the case method as the
dominant way of teaching law in American law schools is that “the students
never obtain a general picture of the law as a whole, not even a picture which
includes only its main features.”267 The teaching of principles and doctrines
under common law through the case method was “being most excellently
performed” at the law schools that Redlich observed, but that did not mean, in
his opinion, that instruction on other traditions and points of the law were being
accomplished.268 Grant Gilmore, aside from tone, made a similar statement that
the case method’s effect was a type of suppression of the actual state and history
of the law:
Since 1800 the principal characteristics of American law had
been its chaotic diversity, its sensitivity to changing conditions,
its fluidity, its pluralism. All that had to be suppressed. . . . It
is also fair to say that the Langdellians, both in their casebooks
and their treatises, performed major surgery on what their
chosen English cases had been about when they were real cases
in a real England. England became our never-never land, our
Shangri-La, our Utopia.269

266. See, e.g., W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 84 (1997) (noting
Edward Phelps’ complaint that “the case method ‘attempt[s] too much’ for the time available and the
capacity of the average student and that ‘[t]o plunge a student into this chaos [of cases], with his powers
untried and imperfect, and his knowledge of principles incomplete, to grope his way through it as best
he may, and to triangulate from case to case, supposing that he is getting forward when he is only going
astray, is not to educate him, but tends rather to make him proof against education’” (alterations in
original) (quoting Edward J. Phelps, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE. L.J. 139, 140–41 (1892))).
267. REDLICH, supra note 213, at 41.
268. See id. at 43 (“But here, also, it seems to me that the historical scaffolding of the English
common law, as a general introduction to the analytical study of Anglo-American law, is extremely
desirable and of the greatest importance. A scientifically constructed survey of the main sources of
the common law and of their relation to one another; of the concepts of customary and positive law; a
short external history of the law, which should include the origin and development of the English courts
of justice; a brief exposition and development of the nature and extent of the concept of equity; a
description of that institution so important for Anglo-American law, the Reports, and of the concept of
precedent; finally also a glance at the phenomenon of statutory law (legislation) and its nature and
forms; all these things and much else connected with them ought to be furnished the students at the
beginning of their studies, before their introduction to the analytical study of the cases. The fact that
this ground can be covered only in elementary and summary fashion need not prevent the presentation
from being thorough and scientific.”).
269. GILMORE, supra note 84, at 48 (footnote omitted).
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Law was a distortion and the method reflected this distortion—a method
that was then used to teach law in American law schools. Therein the ironies
of a presumed completeness, unity, and autonomy in a method with
shortcomings emerge.
Three decades ago, Duncan Kennedy explored the social and political
ramifications of that distortion on American law students.270 In his memorable
crit-laden fashion, Kennedy claimed how law school itself is an ideology, a
sentiment that implies his views on the distortion of law, which made clearer
sense when he unpacked the consequences of seeing that ideology for what it
was:
To say that law school is ideological is to say that what
teachers teach along with basic skills is wrong, is nonsense
about what law is and how it works; that the message about the
nature of legal competence, and its distribution among
students, is wrong, is nonsense; that the ideas about the
possibilities of life as a lawyer that students pick up from legal
education are wrong, are nonsense.271
Seemingly echoing Gilmore’s claim of “indoctrination by brainwashing”
but going even deeper, Kennedy illustrated how the distortion had been
embedded as the status quo of American law schools and its ensuing effects on
law students:
Because students believe what they are told, explicitly and
implicitly, about the world they are entering, they behave in
ways that fulfill the prophecies the system makes about them
and about that world. This is the linkback that completes the
system: students do more than accept the way things are, and
ideology does more than damp opposition.272
Kennedy’s reflections on the distortion of law were just as scathing as
Gilmore’s; for instance, the Socratic dialogue was characterized as
“pseudoparticipation.”273 But his lengthier ruminations drew out more clearly
than Gilmore the distortion’s profound potency and harm. From an
examination of what takes place in the typical Socratic dialogue, “[i]t quickly
emerges that neither the students nor the faculty are as homogeneous as they at
first appeared.”274 That striation, undemocratic at its core in Kennedy’s
270. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54, 54–75 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
271. Id. at 54.
272. Id.; GILMORE, supra note 82, at 13.
273. Kennedy, supra note 270, at 56.
274. Id.
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description, appears as ominous and tense as those moments in a horror flick
when recent converts to a destructive cult recognizes that they’ve been had—
and not in a good way. But in Kennedy’s version, the converts continue to
perpetuate the hierarchy; they continue the path of becoming lawyers, up the
ranks of profession to eventually steer the industry and field.275
Simultaneously, Kennedy criticized the case method for falsifying both the
intellectualism of the law and the practice of lawyering.276 As for how the case
method presented intellectualism of the law, Kennedy found it to be
underwhelming: “The actual intellectual content of the law seems to consist of
learning rules—what they are and why they have to be the way they are—while
rooting for the occasional judge who seems willing to make them marginally
more humane.”277 Was that all there was to the law—just these rules, likely
from cases, and some hope for a meager judicial morality? Kennedy’s
reference to Langdell’s inductive legal science here is glaring. Yet, the case
method distorts more than that—particularly in regard to lawyering. Skills are
taught under the case method, but taught in a twisted “mystified” way that
obscures what skills and lawyering are. Like others before him, Kennedy
contended that the case method substituted notions of lawyering wholesale with
the false primacy of inductive legal reasoning by noting how under the case
method, “law emerges from a rigorous analytical procedure called legal
reasoning”278—one “which is unintelligible to the layperson but somehow both
explains and validates the great majority of the rules in force in our system.”279
His remark here connected the proverbial “thinking like a lawyer” (legal
reasoning) with the idea of law’s completion (Langdell’s formalism), and
served up an underhanded swipe at the case method’s inductive reasoning.
Then he attacked the content of law courses. Specifically, he noted how the
law courses segregated each legal doctrine issue into “a tub on its own bottom,”
which misled students from learning “an integrating vision of what law is, how
it works, or how it might be changed (other than in any incremental, case-bycase, reformist way).”280 That isolation parallels the isolation between legal
reasoning and lawyering that Kennedy found was what law schools perpetrated,
again distorting what law and lawyering was: “‘Legal reasoning’ is sharply
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 72.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
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distinguished from law practice, and one learns nothing about practice.”281 The
consequence ultimately “disables” students from the profession.282
The curricular holdovers from Langdell also perturbed Kennedy.
Recapitulating on the “tubs on their own bottoms” motif, Kennedy criticized
the segregation of law courses, particularly in the first-year curriculum, as a
deliberate, intentional set of separations283 that distorted the reality of law.284
He observed that “peripheral subjects,” such as philosophy of law, history of
law, legal process, and law clinical courses, that give context to the law were
not readily taught as part of the core curriculum because law schools, preferring
inductive reasoning, perceived these other courses as not promoting the “‘hard’
objective, serious, rigorous analytic core of law.”285 Instead, law schools
trivialized these contextual courses as more or less cosmetic, part of the
“finishing school for learning the social art of self-presentation as a lawyer.”286
In this respect, Kennedy here seemed to echo Redlich’s hesitancy more than a
half-century earlier in regards to the case method’s heavy emphasis of
analytical rigor over teaching the context of law—except unlike Redlich, who
was a German outside observer hired by the Carnegie Foundation, Kennedy
was observing as an insider, from within the American legal academy (Harvard,
no less), long after Langdell’s case method had become the status quo.287
Kennedy lamented for an alternative: “A more rational system would
emphasize the way to learn law rather than rules, and skills rather than answers.
Student capacities would be more equal as a result, but students would also be
radically more flexible in what they could do in practice.”288 He hinted at how
the distortion of law through the case method achieved disparity in the way the
Langdellian set-up in law schools created a setting for “enforced cultural
uniformity.”289 If the analytical, inductive rigor of “thinking like a lawyer” has
been the categorical substitute or proxy for what the law was or what lawyers
did—or at least how law schools have used it since Langdell—and if the reason
for inductive reasoning relied on Langdell’s original beliefs in the
281. Id. at 60.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 59–61 (“The curriculum as a whole has a rather similar structure . . . ad hoc.”).
284. Id. at 61 (“Entering students just don’t know enough to figure out where the teacher is
fudging, misrepresenting, or otherwise distorting legal thinking and legal reality.”).
285. Id. at 61.
286. Id.
287. Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 408 n.53 (1971);
Dean H.F. Stone, Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redlich Report, supra note 230, at 91.
288. Kennedy, supra note 270, at 65.
289. Id. at 69.
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completeness, unity, and autonomy of the common law, then the idea of what
was law and how to uncover and study it under the case method was like what
Redlich had said: inaccurate. A more “realistic” idea of law has been siphoned
off only to be reflected by a peculiarly small and limited set of behaviors that
served to reinforce a distorted idea of the norm.290 The cultural implications
were significant here as Kennedy illustrated how that small set of behaviors end
up fetishized at the top of a hierarchy that appeared oppressive, especially to
diverse law students.291 What the case method did with its distortion of law
was to develop in law students “skills that incapacitate rather than empower,
skills that will help you imprison yourself in practice.”292 The minority law
student learned that the skill of assimilation was the oar of survival.293
Meanwhile, everyone who entered the system “accept[ed] the system’s
presentation of itself as largely neutral, as apolitical, meritocratic, instrumental,
a matter of craft,” even though the reality of law was not that way.294 Not only
was the outcome a grim one for legal education as the pedagogy installed as the
status quo was based on a distortion of law, but what was worse in Kennedy’s
view was that it fostered dispassion, detachment, disengagement, and
disenchantment with the law.295
Kennedy is not alone in being political and socially critical of the case
method. Commentators have also attacked the case method’s blindness toward
a plurality of learning styles and capacities in students.296 Accordingly, in this
vein, some have also emphasized how the case method fetishizes abstract
reasoning over a more inclusive set of critical lawyering skills.297 Others have
examined the psychological aspects of the case method and even unflatteringly

290. See id. at 68.
291. See id. at 70.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., id. (“Lower-middle-class students learn not to wear an undershirt that shows, and
that certain patterns and fabrics in clothes will stigmatize them no matter what their grades. Black
students learn without surprise that the bar will have its own peculiar forms of racism, and that their
very presence means affirmative action, unless it means ‘he would have made it even without
affirmative action.’”).
294. Id. at 72.
295. See id. at 73 (referring to a “private self” that students create).
296. See Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case
System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 185 (1986) (asserting that the case method fails to account for
“individualized learning styles and capacities”).
297. See, e.g., Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449 (1996).
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portrayed aspects of it as “infantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing, sadistic, a
tactic for promoting hostility and competition among students, self-serving, and
destructive of positive ideological values.”298 Scholars have also observed that
the way law schools teach the law exalts cold, hard doctrine over the “human
aspects of lawyering—variously called empathetic, affective, feeling, altruistic,
and service aspects of lawyering.”299 Even more incisively, other scholars have
bemoaned that the case method’s sole weight on appellate opinions obscures
the importance of doctrinal analysis to the exclusion of fact analysis in law
practice, which can arguably shift the emphasis away from the doctrine.300
In her existential assessment of law schools, Robin West sees the case
method’s distortion-dispassion correlation as harboring serious implications for
teaching justice in law schools. West differs from others who link the case
method to amoralism.301 Instead, she finds that contemporary American legal
education produces a legalist way of engaging in the law that is due to the sense
of processual fairness students pick up in case method reasoning starting in the
first year and in the method’s preference for performing horizontal equity, of
treating like cases alike.302 Again, the case method’s artificial and distorted
placement of analytical rigor as superior lies at the heart of this conditioning of
law students. Coupled with the legacy of Langdellian formalism that still
remains, the result, as West maintains, marginalizes the thoughts and teachings
on justice, which bodes terribly for instilling a normative sense of jurisprudence
in law students.303
These scholarly and critical observations about the case method largely
target the distortion of law behind the method. It has not been hard for scholars
to surmise that behind the distortion reflected in the case method rests the
mandate of Langdellian nineteenth-century formalism to objectify law,
according to its late nineteenth-century virtues.304 To see larger, more
damaging implications in that objectification of law, postmodernist critiques of
Langdellian formalism offer such implications for contemporary legal

298. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, supra note 287, at 407.
299. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap By Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing
From the MacCrate Report–Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV.
593, 595–96 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
300. Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common
Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 722 (1996).
301. WEST, supra note 14, at 56.
302. Id. at 51–52, 56.
303. Id. at 88.
304. See id. at 101–02.
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education that are even more basic and fundamental than the disconnect
between teaching law and justice that West had indicated.305
As a tradition or mode of analysis concerned with and effected by questions
of instability, postmodern experiences of the law have challenged modernist
conceptions of law for embedded assumptions and establishments of objective
and complete unity in the law as part of the project of legal modernists to find
objective truth in reality.306 In this way, juxtaposition of Langdellian formalism
and postmodernism allows us to see—from a phenomenological way, and even
perhaps in an exaggerated way—the trappings of the conception of law as
science: “What postmodernists do is intensify dissatisfaction with the
narrowness of professional knowledge about law.”307 Specifically, postmodern
jurisprudence’s obsession with the politics of form and the concept of the
subjective in law has much to say about Langdellian formalism.308 While
Langdell’s formalism perpetuated certain ideals about law—its completeness,
autonomy, neutrality, etc.—and reinforced those ideals through its form—the
case method—to the point of objectifying the law as its own living, breathing
entity, postmodernism critiques the gaps in that endeavor, noting that,
underneath the sorcery, the ideals and norms are never that neutral, complete,
or objective.309
Most notably, the politics of form and the concept of subjectivity in
postmodern legal thought has focused on the missing subject in Langdellian
conception of law and its associated problems.310 According to postmodernist
thought, Langdell’s legal conception of law as science objectified law in a way
that hid its first human author, Langdell, and its subsequent authors as well.311

305. See id. at 27, 105–06.
306. Minda, supra note 142, at 354.
307. See id. (“Until recently, legal theorists were unaware of the influence of legal modernism.
Indeed, legal thinkers did not become aware of the existence of legal modernism until a rival
perspective, postmodernism, appeared in the legal academy and challenged the visions, ideas, and
practices of modern legal thinkers.”).
308. See id. at 374.
309. See WEST, supra note 14, at 70–71, 71 n.70; Pierre Schlag, “Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi”:
The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1637
(1990); Minda, supra note 142, at 354.
310. See Schlag, supra note 158, at 1632–34, 1637.
311. See id. at 1646 (“Recall that the occasion for conceiving Langdellian formalism as grounded
in a transcendental order of the object was the almost invariable effacement of the individual subject
(e.g., ‘Chris Langdell’) whenever he spoke of law.”); see also id. at 1637 (quoting 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE,
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 39 (2d ed. 1935) (“It is assumed by most authorities that if the
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As Pierre Schlag has observed, much of this veiling or “effacement” of the
author was effectuated through ritualized rhetoric of the law as well as the act
of inductive legal reasoning.312 Taking his contracts casebook as a prime
example, Schlag notes how Langdell interchanges authorial viewpoints
depending on whether he was writing about the law or whether he was writing
about pedagogy:
[W]henever Chris [Langdell] addresses a matter of pedagogy
in his preface, the “I” is all over the place. And yet, quite
mysteriously, as soon as the law makes its appearance in the
preface, the “I” vanishes. Chris disappears. Dean Langdell is
removed. Even you, the reader, begin to experience a certain
ego loss. Could it be God? Is it love? No, it’s law—law and
science: ‘Law, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles or doctrines.’313
Ritualized and repeated in this way, the law as voiced and written by
Langdellian formalists loses its authors and instead the impression is that
“[c]ontract law does things; the rules speak, the doctrine evolves and develops”
and “[m]odern legal scholars have since followed Langdell’s example; accounts
of the subject are rare in contemporary legal scholarship because subjectivity is
sublimated in legal forms and because only certain kinds of subjects can be
vested in these legal forms.”314 As Gary Minda seems to suggest, the
Langdellian vision of legal science encouraged this mimicry—“to write in the
passive voice and to rigorously maintain the detached demeanor of a scientist
conducting a controlled experiment”315—which has resulted in experiences of
the law by modern legal scholars that have been “somehow ‘constrained’ and
‘bounded’ by law’s professional method of analysis and orientation.”316 What
is worse is the myth of disengagement: “And, yet, in removing their subjective
presence from their discussion of the law, modern legal scholars have also
assumed that they are capable of excluding their own personal subjective
identities from their work.”317 They “assume, in other words, that they are
becoming relatively empty, abstract, and universal subjects-in-control of the
judges did not make, but discovered the law, then in the absence of legislation the law must remain
what it has always been, and therefore by a process of backward projection, it is argued that unless the
courts changed the law the law must have been the same in 1200 that it is today.” (emphasis added))).
312. Id. at 1646–56.
313. Id. at 1633–34 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing KENNETH BURKE,
A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 355 (1945); and then quoting LANGDELL, supra note 110, at vi).
314. Minda, supra note 142, at 380.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 380–81.
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law.”318 The problem with this ritualized uniformity and passivity that tries to
mimic the scientific, as Minda implies, is that all of this falsity, pretense, and
subordination trickles down to professional inculcation, which is what law
schools are tasked to do: “Hence, the expression ‘thinking like a lawyer’ makes
sense because it is thought that all lawyers think alike.’”319
The established ritual of rhetoric in legal reasoning not only subordinates
its subjects but also its act of concealing through language and the
overshadowing of subjects by the objectification of law makes any inquiries
about that author difficult to achieve. Here is how that emphasis of inductive
legal reasoning creates this hermetic problem as it contributes to the
objectification of law and at the same time minimizes the subject: “[L]egal rules
are explained, analyzed, and criticized as if they were transcendental objects
unaffected by analyzing subjects.”320 These attributes of rhetoric and reasoning
under Langdell is the crux of a popularized formalist style.321 In this way, the
law achieves objectification because “the law is a transcendental object
unaffected by social and economic context”322 and the result is prevention
“from confronting the hidden assumption of the autonomous legal subject.”323
But postmodernism has recontextualized the subject in law as anything but
an autonomous being. A “serious predicament” for legal scholars is revealing
that “the subject is a problem” because “[t]here are many different subjects who
interpret the law.”324 How does one justify the law as transcendental, neutral,
complete, and autonomous when “the meaning of law depends on the various
constructions of different subjects”?325 The identities of the “subjects-incontrol of the law” matter.326 The revelation that law is “man-made”—not its
own living scientific entity that reflects universal truths of the world—reflects
humanity (and undoubtedly has reflected a certain kind of humanity, even under

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 381.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 381.
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Langdell’s order).327 Meanwhile, we lack a language to articulate the law in
this way, or reference points for this more realistic or truthful point of view
about law. This predicament is debilitating for legal scholars because it makes
them confront subjectivity. Likewise, as the politics of form and subordination
of the self/subject is reflected in the case method through the same rhetoric and
legal reasoning, the predicament is also debilitating—or couched in Duncan
Kennedy’s terms, disabling—because in its continued use of the case method
with its objectification and distortions of law, law schools pass these same
problems of the subject in law to their students.328
This postmodern critique suggests that Langdell’s dispassionate,
disengaged version of law and the case method subverts the human in law by
concealing subjectivity through its rhetoric and formalist style and emphasizing
an idealized, legalistic objectivity. The lack of focus on the subject—in the
context of law school students—and the myth that the subject does not exist has
serious ramifications. “Langdellian formalism reduces the subject to a
subordinate, trivial role, the performance of that trivial role remains essential to
the ‘reading’ of the object order of law.”329 If that is the case, then American
legal education is an ineffectual life raft floating on waters now revealed to be
deeper and more treacherous than we have known. Its methodology is
irrelevant and disempowering.
Yet, even with such postmodernist commentary nearly two decades ago,
American law schools continue to rely on Langdellian pedagogy.330 Since even
the realists, the academy has long-recognized the Langdellian conception of
law as science as having some virtues but altogether unencompassing as a way
to study and develop law,331 yet still the shell of the case method traps law
schools from progressing forward.
Prior to the recent crisis of legal education, Edward Rubin, in a critical
stance against the Langdellian case method, hypothesized reasons why the case
method still persisted in law schools, despite its outdatedness.332 He argues that
the case method’s “very obsolescence” had engendered an appearance of its
“immutab[ility]” so hard that “it seems less a tradition than a fact of nature.”333
327. Id. at 382 (“This inquiry can be threatening and, indeed, frightening to many contemporary
legal thinkers because it potentially exposes how legal codes, texts, professional habits, and grammar
constitute subjectivity in the law.”).
328. See generally Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1683–86 (1996).
329. Schlag, supra note 158, at 1637.
330. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 642.
331. Id. at 635–36.
332. Id. at 613–15.
333. Id. at 613–14.
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First, the boat seems hard to rock. Additionally, Rubin observed that the
complacency created by the fiscal powerhouses of law schools as money
makers for universities and law faculty members as beneficiaries reduce any
competing urge to change the status quo.334 Now there’s reluctance to rock the
boat. And finally, Rubin offers one more reason that law schools have kept the
case method, which in part is self-defeating: faculty members at law schools
tend to read “a false appearance of modernity” into the case method.335 In
staying on the boat and not rocking it, we tell ourselves that the boat is truly
state-of-the-art in order to justify continual refrain from rocking the boat.
Moreover, “[o]ur failure to progress paints the Langdellian original with false
colors of modernity, misleading us into thinking that the rationales for his
curriculum correspond to our current understanding of law, society, and
education.”336
Ten years have passed since Rubin’s observations.337 At least one of his
proffered justifications—the fiscal health and financial stability of law
schools—is no longer quite the case because of the current and recent crisis of
legal education.338 They are, borrowing another of Duncan Kennedy’s phrases,
quite the fiscal “tubs on their own bottoms” as they might have been.339 With
that prong no longer true, justification for keeping the case method afloat in
contemporary American law schools seems even more uncertain—especially if
the only reasons are the first and third ones that Rubin mentioned. In an updated
but still critical view about the future of legal education in 2014, Rubin has
given two trends in society that may propel changes in legal education whether
law schools like it or not.340 First is the rise of a knowledge-based economy, in
which “the increasing complexity of society in general” and “legal expertise, as
knowledge, is more central to the sources of wealth in that new economy,” will
require a restructuring of law schools that may include additional years and
intensity of instruction.341 Currently, because law schools still “retain[] an
approach to pedagogy developed before Dewey, Piaget, Montessori, and all the
other founders of twentieth-century educational theory,” they “teach at the same
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 614–15.
Id. at 615.
Id.
See id. at 611.
Id. at 614; WEST, supra note 14, at 16–17.
See Kennedy, supra note 270, at 59.
Rubin, Future and Legal Education, supra note 44, at 507–08.
Id. at 510.
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level of specificity in all three years. In effect, they are teaching three years of
second-year courses.”342 Instead, Rubin suggest a graduated approach where
the first year is “more introductory and foundational” and the third year is more
interactive and advanced so that it “give[s] students an opportunity to work in
a more participatory and interactive manner and to investigate one area of law
in more detail.”343 The result is more subjectivity, empowerment, and relevance
in learning law and practice so that students “develop an appreciation for the
complexity of modern law and an understanding of the ways to deal with, and
take advantage of, that complexity.”344
Another concerning trend that Rubin examines is the teaching of social
justice in law schools: “The second major social trend that is directly relevant
to legal education is the ongoing demand, both moral and political, for social
justice.”345 The relevance is two-fold. First, intertwined with the knowledge
revolution is the rising need for “people to enforce their traditional rights to the
new products that our knowledge-based economy is producing.”346
Technology’s drive to complexity in life will translate to protection and
enforcement of individual rights whether in private commercial law or criminal
law.347 Second, such advancements and corresponding legal services will need
to be equally distributed and accessible to avoid social injustice.348 But for now,
“[t]he challenge is that the law school curriculum, in its present form, is
designed to train students to provide legal services to corporations, wealthy
individuals, and prosperous small-town elites, not to the working classes or the
underprivileged.”349 Rubin’s fault with the Langdellian method here, in the
realm of teaching justice, is similar to Robin West’s dissatisfaction.350 Others
in the academic world have similarly observed justice teaching as a goal of
contemporary law schools.351
Rubin’s reasons for changing legal education and pedagogy should prompt
concern. But if the fundamental pedagogy of law schools detaches the student
from the law in the way that the commentators above have described in service
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 513.
346. Id. at 514.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Cf. WEST, supra note 14 at 154–55.
351. See, e.g., Peter L. Davis, Why Not A Justice School? On the Role of Justice in Legal
Education and the Construction of a Pedagogy of Justice, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 513 (2007); Anthony
D’Amato, Rethinking Legal Education, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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of a model of law that overly objectifies and distorts the reality of the law and
the control and instrumentality of the law, then how do law schools expect to
empower their students to be capable legal thinkers, as well as stay relevant to
the actual nature of the law? Are law schools just drifting on by, and is there a
conception that could support a new pedagogy?
Part IV will introduce one concept that seeks to address these issues.
IV. INSTRUMENTALITY CONCEPTION
To merely reconfigure the case method is to engender further justifications
for the method’s continuing use and legacy in American legal education.
Consequently, the response in Part IV charts more fundamentally toward
creating a contemporary conceptualization of law rather than transplanting the
practices of the Langdellian method into new waters—essentially allowing it to
linger afloat in American law schools for educating and influencing further
generations of lawyers.352 The intent here is to broaden and change existing
pedagogical traditions by conjuring the topic of law school study and inquiry—
that is, law—in ways beyond the system of a nineteenth-century scientific legal
paradigm in hopes to avoid the kind of objectification discussed in Parts II &
III, and to bring the Subject (or Subjects) of law explicitly into the study of it.
To arrive at this solution requires finding one underlying conception of law—
not necessarily an all-encompassing one, but a conception that will generate
newer and less constricting ways to teach law and lawyering; a conception that
is less empirical and hopefully less arrogant in its ambitions; one that can better
facilitate pluralism while focusing on relevance and empowerment. This task
is possible if we stop trying to categorize what law is in a formalist way and
instead begin examining and working with its characteristics, inherent
aesthetics, and effects. Thus, the idea of law as instrumentality seeks to do so
in this manner.
Previous parts of this Article have inferred and explored the fallacies of
categorizing law as a unified body and how that distortion seeps into
pedagogical methods with critically problematic results.353 In part, the
movements of American legal thought that have followed Langdellian
formalism—from American legal realism to postmodernism—have exposed
such fallacies by their separate reactions to the assumption of law’s complete
352. See GILMORE, supra note 82, at 13 (referring to the case method as “indoctrination through
brainwashing”).
353. See supra Section II.A.
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unity and autonomy.354 Each movement, in its own thought, has identified gaps
to the law that defy unity.355 Such observations could indicate either that these
gaps exist in a present state of modernism or that the modernist movement has
been entirely superseded by postmodernity.356 Although it seems more
convincing that postmodernity is the current era,357 both observations suggest
that achieving unity in law is ultimately impracticable.358 To know this truth of
the matter, but to continue preoccupied over unity and autonomy is debilitating
after a while—especially if that while has lasted for more than a century. Why
then, other than intellectual and academic complacency,359 do we still justify
teaching only a limited set of approaches to the law by adhering to a pedagogy
that embraces those fallacies? Despite our modern considerations and
presumptions of law and its practices, why are we still setting sails to chase
after a mythical beast in the ocean in the way Langdell had once chased?
Conversely, studying law under a concept of its instrumentality does not
send our students out to uncover a singular unitary body of law only to watch
them crash on rocky shores. Law is not a mythical beast lurking out in the high
seas for hunt. Borrowing from Gertrude Stein, “there is no there there”360 in
that endeavor; no beast of that mythos awaits our capture, but only intellectual
cruelty in its mandate and the high possibilities of being led off-course, of
academic ship-wrecks, and rumors transmitted across the high seas about legal
education’s demise.
Instead, there are qualities existing in law and its practices that prompt and
beckon exploration. When we experience the law, we experience its
characteristics and effects.361 Studying and teaching law by starting with its
instrumentalities is one way of accessing the inquiry into law and the various
qualities and characteristics of its agency without the prerequisite of a ritual
354. See Minda, supra note 142.
355. See id.
356. Id. at 388–89.
357. See infra Section IV.B.
358. See Minda, supra note 142, at 389–90.
359. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 614 (describing the narrow self-interest of law faculty that
implies complacency).
360. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937) (emphasis added). Stein
used the phrase to describe her sentiments about visiting her childhood home in Oakland, California.
Id.
361. See Jennifer L. Culbert, Shattering Law: Encounters with Love in Billy Budd, 28
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 765 (2010) (“When this experience [of law] is described, it is usually represented
as an experience of being subject to an external or internal will that uses the promise of physical harm,
moral suffering, psychological pain, or social distress, to deprive us of the opportunity to achieve or
enjoy some desired end.”).
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established by the case method that is no longer justified by Langdellian
formalism. In fact, a conception of law based on instrumentality deconstructs
the assumptions of law under formalism by studying law’s aesthetics and
agency detached from grand narratives and ideologies. To move from grand
ideologies, we must start with some instability;362 and instrumentality offers
enough multiple meanings to be a starting point.
A. Etymology
In law, the word “instrumentality” has its resident usage and definitions,
but both its technical uses and meanings reveal some degree of instability as
well. Under Black’s Law Dictionary, “instrumentality” is defined primarily as
“[a] thing used to achieve an end or purpose”363 and then secondarily as “a
means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished,
such as a branch of a governing body.”364 The word has its anchors in several
different bodies of law, and both primary and secondary meanings appear
readily in usage. In tort law, “instrumentality” appears in res ipsa loquitor and
strict liability cases and doctrines, typically serving as strawman or proxy for
broadly describing the harmful conduct or items that a tortious actor can control
to set in motion.365 In the law of business associations, instrumentality appears
in the corporate veil doctrine as the “thing” that corporate actors use to shield
their illicit activities behind the legal entity.366 In the criminal context, the Earl
Warren majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio367 used the phrase, “instrumentalities
of the crime,” in part to describe items directed in the act of police stop and
frisk.368 Of course, more seemingly benign uses of “instrumentality” exist, for

362. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 163 (“[P]ostmodern legal theorists constantly question the
ostensible stability of particular words as well as entire legal texts.”).
363. Instrumentality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (10th ed. 2014).
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1944) (“[T]he
doctrine may be applied upon the theory that defendant had control at the time of the alleged negligent
act, although not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first proves that the condition of the
instrumentality had not been changed after it left the defendant’s possession.”); E. I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1949) (discussing “dangerous instrumentalities”
in strict liability).
366. In re Hoffmann, 475 B.R. 692, 699 (Bankr. D.Minn. 2012) (describing the corporation as
“the alter ego or mere instrumentality of the shareholder” in the test required to pierce the corporate
veil).
367. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
368. Id. at 25.
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instance, in federal statutory guidelines where “instrumentality” could be a state
or private agency369 and, of course, in employment law in the realm of
entrustment and agency.370 The word in its current legal usage does not appear
in some modern legal dictionaries such as those reaching back to the late
nineteenth or early twentieth centuries—for instance, Irving Browne’s
Common Words and Phrases371 or the 8th edition of Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary.372 However, in English law, “instrumentality” is listed in Frederick
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary: “[A] Solicitor is entitled to a charge for his costs
on property recovered or preserved through his ‘instrumentality.’”373 Stroud’s
Judicial Dictionary specifically references the use of “instrumentality” in an
1885 Chancery opinion by an English court that referred to the agency of an
attorney and his work.374
From the examples above and others, we can see that the term embodies a
degree of instability and malleability, appearing in both public and private areas
of law; as a business entity or commercial activity; or a dangerous item or an
item in use of perpetrating a crime; or as an item possible of being controlled
and used for a purpose. The word, “instrumental,” at the root of
“instrumentality,” helps to connote usefulness or qualities in furthering a
purpose375 and ultimately connects “instrumentality” to its meaning in legal
usage: agency.376 But the degree of non-specification in the idea of agency
connotes neutral ambivalence—almost ironically, a democratic one—that has
allowed the word, “instrumentality,” to be used in both benign and harmful
legal contexts, as noted above.377 Of course, in legal theory and philosophy,
the “instrumental” root in “instrumentality” could also connote the theory of
pragmatic instrumentalism that has considerable relevant dominance in
American legal discourse.378 This Article relies on the suffix, “ity,” in
“instrumentality” however, to sustain its ambivalence from direct associations

369. E.g., Service for Public Institution or Instrumentality, Idaho Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 1357.45.
370. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 239 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
371. See IRVING BROWNE, COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES (1883).
372. See BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914).
373. 2 F. STROUD, THE JUDICIAL DICTIONARY, OF WORDS AND PHRASES JUDICIALLY
INTERPRETED, TO WHICH HAS BEEN ADDED STATUTORY DEFINITIONS 988–89 (2d ed. 1903).
374. Id. (quoting In re Wadsworth [1885], CH 29 at 517).
375. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 363, at 919.
376. Id.
377. See supra Section IV.A.
378. See ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 23
(1982).
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with that school of thought. Instrumentality here can be “pragmatic” or not—
just like law’s instrumentality can be “pragmatic” or not. But in one aspect or
another, despite some variance, all of the results of this quick etymology in
modern legal vernacular points to “instrumentality” in law as a quality
describing a purposeful function in its form.
Outside of law, the plain-meaning of “instrumentality” shares some
overlapping characteristics to its usage in law, as non-legal dictionaries
continue to denote the word’s agency function;379 however, some dictionaries
recognize the word’s function more explicitly as a quality and not the thing
itself.380 As an example, Merriam-Webster lists its primary definition of
“instrumentality” as “the quality or state of being instrumental.”381 Similarly,
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) registers the meaning in the primary as
“[t]he quality or condition of being instrumental; the fact or function of serving
or being used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end; agency.”382
Secondarily, the OED defines the word as “[t]hat which serves or is employed
for some purpose or end; a means, an agency.”383 In tracing its usage
historically, the OED lists discovery of its early usage in religious contexts in
the fifteenth century, in examples of criticizing the agencies of a passive faith
and the physical world in relation to salvation and the Divine.384 A related
word, “instrumentalness,” has a usage around the same time, also in the
religious context—also pejoratively describing the failings of human nature.385
Its root words—“instrument” and “instrumental”—both have varied extensions
in history. The OED lists “instrument” as being used later, though in a law
context, to describe “a formal legal document.”386 The word, “instrumental,”
had its “subservient” use and meanings in the fourteenth century.387 This earlier
use of “instrumental” and the later “instrument” suggests that the actual root of
the word “instrumentality” might be “instrumental” and that its legal

379. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1052 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).
380. See
Instrumentality,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/instrumentality [https://perma.cc/N27A-G2A7] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017);
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 379, at 1052.
381. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, supra note 380.
382. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 379, at 1052.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See id. (quoting reference to Satan’s instrumentality).
386. Id. at 1051.
387. Id.
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connotations was borne out of the intervening use of “instrument” to refer to
documents that carried some agency of accomplishing legal effect.
From close readings of the OED’s identified earliest uses of
“instrumentality,” one could gather that “instrumentality” was used in a much
more materialistic and earthly connotation, associated with mankind and not
with the works and power of God. Indeed, this conclusion could be bolstered
by associations of the root word, “instrumental,” (rather than “instrument”)
with the material.388 But, as is presently within the OED, the word,
“instrumentality,” even despite materiality, has a broad usage with an emphasis
on the forms and qualities of agency.389 Both religious and secular examples
conveying this observation are attached to the word’s primary and secondary
meanings; beneath the primary meaning in the OED, the word’s qualitative
connotations of agency have described human religious faith (“Physical[]
instrumentality”), civil government (“instrumentality of men”), and even the
handiwork of a particular person (“instrumentality of Churchill”).390 Its
secondary meaning as having an agency for some purposeful end has been used
to compare the limits of physical nature versus God’s omnipotent capabilities
(“the subsidiary Instrumentalities of Nature”),391 a type of philosophical agent
of faith (“[t]he moral and intelligent instrumentality”),392 illicit human
corruption in governance (“human instrumentality”),393 and an active force in
transforming civilization (“powerful instrumentalities”).394 In this way, it
seems that the word’s currency is both in its slippage to fit different contexts or
modify various subjects, and in its underlying objective to describe the qualities
of purposefulness or capabilities of something or someone—even if, as in one
of the religious examples above, it describes a capability (of men) that is not as
useful compared to something else (God or the Divine). Henceforth, as
discussed below, law as “instrumentality” relies heavily on this explicit
meaning of quality.
Other associations with the word “instrumentality” are also possible.
Beyond the legal and theoretical ideas of pragmatic instrumentalism,
“instrumentality” in the larger vernacular could also remotely allude to John
Dewey’s political pragmatic theory of instrumentalism “that thought exists as

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See id.
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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an instrument of adjustment to the environment.”395 Again, the “instrumental”
word-root is the culprit. But likewise, here, as in law, the use of
“instrumentality” rather than “instrumental” seeks to advocate for a similar
ambivalence rather than a wholesale import of that theory. Also, the possible
allusion to both legal and non-legal philosophies ought to point to the word’s
slippage.396 As we will see below, by emphasizing an umbrella usage, the
word’s instability likens its use here with some—though not all—indefinable
qualities of the postmodern condition.397 It offers an extensive and versatile
use—though it is ultimately not completely comprehensive or, at least, so
comprehensive that it swallows its meaning.398 Also what has instrumentality
might also be relative to whom or what that instrumentality serves. And lastly,
the irony for now is that the word could quite possibility embody a teleological
posture through its aesthetics and functions to describe agency or goals—which
some approaches to postmodernism tend to reject.399 Facetiously, the

395. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 379, at 1052.
396. See FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 38.
397. Id.
398. In this way, the postmodern resonance or slippage in reading the word “instrumentality” for
the purposes of establishing a conception of law in this Article harkens to the debate in critical legal
studies about the functions of queer and feminist theories. For instance, Shannon Gilreath has observed
that:
Queer theory, with its celebration of sexual violence and death and its pointed
rejection of law as a means to change, is anchored in this kind of unreality because
it is detached from gay people’s experiences. This is not to say, of course, that
those people postulating queer theory are not entitled to a claim to experiences
that matter or are real, but only to say that queer theory proceeds from a posture
that is swallowed by its particularities. . . . Queer theory is, in this respect, either
remarkably cruel or its progenitors are really quite far removed from the realities
most women and gay people face. Force and sexual abuse seem a lot less like a
lovely academic game of charades when you are the one with the fist in your face.
As an opposite of queer theory, “A feminist theory and practice attempts to
account for the fracturing of reality, and then to make reality whole again.”
Shannon Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 109, 137
(2013) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (first citing ANDREA DWORKIN, LIFE & DEATH:
UNAPOLOGETIC WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR AGAINST WOMEN 118 (1997); and then quoting
Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 25, 52 (1989)). Because of its implicit normative nature, as we will see, infra Section
IV.B, the “law as instrumentality” here resembles feminist theory in comparison to Gilreath’s narrowly
described gestures toward reality.
399. Anthony E. Cook, Foreword: Towards A Postmodern Ethics of Service, 81 GEO. L.J. 2457,
2466 (1993) (“After all, one of postmodernism’s objectives is to expose the unspoken normative and
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metaphysical conceit would be “instrumentality’s” inherent “instrumentalism”
or “instrumentality.” As later parts of this section will show, this conception
embraces approaches to postmodernism that recognizes teleology.400 What is
clear here, for now, is that “instrumentality,” for the purposes of this Article’s
premise, can and ought to embody a certain degree of vagueness.
The negotiation of this word between its broad definitions as a legal term
of art and its even more expansive applications in the plain language is where
this Article seeks to begin using the fluid currency of the word for application
within the thought of law as instrumentality. Of course, this etymology is quick
and not exhaustive. But in this brief explication, the study reveals that
“instrumentality” embodies an inherent strawman quality that prompts further
dissection. Its limits, of course, are not endless; indeed, its contours are also
fitted within the characteristic of agency or facility for the purpose, agency, or
ends of something else.
That something else, of course, could be law itself. Importing the definition
and slippage of the word above, studying law as instrumentality could mean
learning the law and its practices by starting from instability and reaching
toward the qualities of instrumentality in law first in order to examine and seek
meaning—looking at moments where the law has instrumentality and when the
law fails to embody it. From there, these observations of instrumentality lead
us to an ontological perspective that uncovers multiple possible perspectives of
what law is; what its purpose is; how it is created and practiced; where or in
what form is it situated; what reasoning goes into that practice; who creates,
practices, or benefits from the law; what condition is the political system that
embodies law; what theories and histories have shaped its perpetuation in form
and content; and so on.401 Instrumentality provides the tangible pressure point
that provokes intellectual and practical meanings. By looking at the qualities
of a law that purports to have agency in fulfilling certain goals, a study based
on “law as instrumentality” would seek out various types of questions to
achieve understanding and knowledge.

teleological commitments snuggled away in discourses claiming neutrality, objectivity, and functional
universality.”).
400. See infra Section IV.B.
401. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 640–41 (discussing that to study law and practice as “a
modern social orientation, is to observe the totality of . . . behaviors” that bridge legal knowledge,
functions of law and lawyering, and the effects of law on individuals and societies).
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B. Ontology
In terms of a historical and chronological characterization, many have
argued that postmodernity is the era presently before us.402 First, one could
look physically at the current reality and posit that postmodernity is the
“situation in which we find ourselves.”403 The physical and material side of
this postmodern “situation” reflects, as J.M. Balkin notes, “an era of industrial
practices and mass organization and production applied not to material objects
like automobiles but to products of the mind—art and music, knowledge and
information, accounting and other service industries.”404 In his historical
description of postmodernity, Adam Todd alludes to this transcendence of
technology from modernist industrial production, “when western societies
adjusted to the use of machines in the home and workplaces,”405 to a time and
space postmodernly “when people are becoming accustomed with computers,
easily accessible information, and high technology.”406 That is the material
realization of change or “upgrade” from the era of modernity into
postmodernity. But technology’s progression from realizing the production of
material items in industry—which was characteristic of modernity407—to
realizing the production of information is only the start of defining
postmodernism because postmodernity is not just about the physical
transition;408 it is also about the social and cultural consciousness in reaction to
that transition to information. Jean-François Lyotard describes this reaction as
“incredulity toward metanarratives.”409 Others have supplemented their
characterization of postmodernity beyond empirical observations about
technology and information, by observing the “skepticism” people have toward
the dominance of grand theories during modernity.410 In postmodernity, both
402. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 9 (“[W]e are presently in the midst of the postmodern era.”);
J. M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1967–68 (1992)
(“[P]ostmodernism is the cultural era in which we live—the era of postmodernity.”). See generally
JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1979).
403. Balkin, supra note 402, at 1972.
404. Id. at 1974.
405. Adam G. Todd, Painting A Moving Train: Adding “Postmodern” to the Taxonomy of Law,
40 U. TOL. L. REV. 105, 110 (2008).
406. Id.
407. See Balkin, supra note 402, at 1974.
408. Id. at 1972. Not only is postmodernism a “situation in which we find ourselves,” as Balkin
describes, it is also “a cultural response to that situation.” Id.
409. LYOTARD, supra note 402, at xxiv.
410. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 405, at 110–12.
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historical chronology and cultural psychology work in tandem to define this
era.411 So much so that Stephen Feldman has collapsed the observations
regarding the historical and cultural attributes of this time when he affirms how
this current era is postmodern rather than modern.412 And consequently, the
reflection that we are in a postmodern era leads to conclusions that “products
or laws coming out of this period might be considered or labeled
postmodern.”413 This extrapolation may seem too simplistic or circumstantial
as a label. But there is method to this conclusion. To challenge modernist
avowals “that postmodernism affects only certain segments of contemporary
life”414 and that “[t]here is no postmodern law,”415 Balkin points out that the
technological production itself of law is postmodern:
The industrial model of production—where production is
reinterpreted according to discrete units of production
measurable in temporal or spatial categories—has already
arrived in law. We already have the seventy-hour billed week,
the canned brief, the 500-person law firm churning out
mountains of paper to prove its value to its corporate clientele.
We already have mass-produced litigation and mass-produced
judicial administration to deal with it. Already most federal
judicial opinions are written by twenty-five-year olds, so that
the language of opinions does not really mean what it says,
because it was not said by the persons whose meaning really
counts.416
In this way, returning to Todd’s bluntly-stated considerations that laws such
as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and others are postmodern laws
411. See Balkin, supra note 402, at 1972 (“[P]ostmodernsim is both a cultural situation and a set
of claims about how that culture should be interpreted, altered and continued.”).
412. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 9.
413. Todd, supra note 405, at 110 (citing Balkin, supra note 402, at 1969).
414. Robert Post, Postmodern Temptations, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 391, 396 (1992) (reviewing
FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991)).
415. Id.
416. Balkin, supra note 402, at 1974. To observe the industrialization of law practice that further
substantiates his response to modernist challenges regarding the reality of postmodernity, Balkin adds
that
[o]lder conceptions of professionalism have already been supplanted by an
industrial model where service is defined in terms of discrete units of production
that can be duplicated and evaluated on a mass scale. The lawyers let go by large
New York law firms after the 1987 stock market crash quickly learned that
employment practices in service sectors, and even in professional service sectors,
had mutated into a model of employer-employee relations quite like those that
Ford or General Motors applied to blue collar workers.
Id.
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because of their enactment after modernity,417 Todd’s assertions possess
justification.
Beyond chronology, this Article’s interest in postmodernity focuses on
postmodernism’s cultural and philosophical approach to reality and power.418
In contrast to a modernist fixation on objectivity or grand theories, the
postmodern psychology is skeptical of categorical truth—or in Lyotard’s words
“metanarratives”419—and focuses on inquiry and observations that reveal
multiple narratives and subjectivity in reality;420 it accomplishes such revelation
by recognizing slippage and, as a result, rendering multiple meanings.421 In
doing so, the rendering of meanings is often fixated with exposing where power
lies.422 In the postmodern era, the search to expose power is where the
skepticism toward grand narratives as a response to new historical progress of
technology and information collides with the vast commodification that result.
Whoever holds the key to that advancement and commodification holds the
power. Skepticism of that progress has the ability to expose power and the
hegemony that replicates that power. Because the Langdellian conception of
law replicates hierarchy and thus withholds power, it is within this sentiment
that this Article embeds as subversion the instrumentality conception of law.
In examining the instrumentalities of law in the law classroom, we
conceptualize the law postmodernly. By isolating its instrumentalities, we can
evaluate and find meaning in the form and aesthetic of law first without
assuming the success of a grand idea—such as objectivity—although we might
417. Todd, supra note 405, at 110.
418. Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman, Introduction to SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND
IDENTITY POLITICS 7 (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995) (describing that postmodernism
possesses “the tendency in elements of [other critical theories] to forget that what they were calling
‘reason’ or ‘history’ or ‘women’ came out of a particular context and were implicated in relations of
power”).
419. LYOTARD, supra note 402, at xxiv.
420. Minda, supra note 142, at 384–87.
421. See id. at 386 (“Postmodernism emerges in response to the crisis and predicaments
intensified by contemporary pragmatic and ironic criticism. These new forms of legal criticism have
brought attention to the need for tolerance of diversity existing in the larger culture. Without doubt,
the ‘buzz word’ in the academy today is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is about diversity and
culture. Its appeal is based on the belief of many women, gay, and non-white Americans that the
discourse of modern law has erected a barrier that excludes minority perspectives and discourses from
active participation in the deliberative processes of the law. In their writing about the law,
contemporary legal thinkers, whether they be pragmatist or ironist critics, reveal, wittingly and
unwittingly, how legal texts, discourses, codes, and canons of legal interpretation deny the existence
of alternative and different notions of the self.”).
422. Todd, supra note 405, at 126–27 (citation omitted).
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recognize that the law being studied might have been ascribed to it. In this way,
if we are dealing with a law premised on objectivity or autonomy, we begin to
fracture such formalist notions. Then as we decode the instrumentalities to find
meaning, that interpretive act reveals the construct of law, which invariably
implicates human subjectivity. We can pose descriptive questions about the
underlying purpose of that law and how it is effectuated: What goals or policies
does the law accomplish or seeks to accomplish? And how do the aspects of its
form and practice do that? And to what extent are these instrumentalities
successful? Or we can ask questions about the actors (or the Subject(s)) within
that instrumentality. First, we can ask and study what skills are involved in
creating that instrumentality: How does the actor or subject control such
instrumentalities to accomplish those goals behind a certain law?
Procedurally or strategically through a type of reasoning? How could we do
it better? But then, more importantly, we can also ask questions that lead us to
answer who has power within the law: Who accomplishes those goals through
law as instrumentality? Whose goals are they? Who benefits, directly or
indirectly? Who can access that instrumentality? Finally, though some may
not regard this next gesture as postmodern, we can critique philosophically and
normatively: Are such goals just or moral? Are they socially or politically
efficacious? Are they political goals? Are there any bigger goals? Should
there be other goals that the instrumentalities of this law do not fulfill? An
instrumentality conception, in this way, serves as a broad reference point that
uses law’s aesthetics in order to critique it and, as a result, understand and learn
about law beyond its autonomous facade; it does not accept goals behind a
certain instrumentality in law and therefore does not embrace the teleology that
a certain law seeks to demonstrate. In fact, relying on a law’s instrumentality,
the instrumentality conception provokes discussions on the success and failings
of such instrumentality, the degrees of accomplishments of such goals behind
law, and the subjects that are empowered and disempowered by the law.
But the instrumentality conception is not merely descriptive in this way. Its
eventual fixation could be partly teleological, in a normative sense. Some
might argue that this fixation on teleology prevents the instrumentality
conception from being truly postmodern in theory; after all, postmodernism has
the tendency to fixate on a deconstructive mode to the exclusion of seeking
normativity.423 According to some, postmodernism’s rejection of grand
theories—which is an effective way of eviscerating formalist ideas of
objectivity in law—can interfere with any ability to encourage normative

423. See Schlag, supra note 309, at 1631.
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aspirations in law at all;424 its ironic perseverations can be nihilistic and hinder
that transformative gesture—and some may even argue that transformation and
normativity are not postmodernism’s intentions.425
But to consider
postmodernism in this theoretical way only is to value it narrowly and in some
ways to treat postmodernism as itself a grand theory—a premise that it seems
to reject.426 Other schools of thought on postmodernism disagree; there are
perspectives about postmodernism that allow it to liberate inquiries beyond
irony.427 But even according to Balkin, postmodernism can have goals.428
Using the postmodern mode of deconstruction, for example, Balkin notes that
even
[t]ranscendental deconstruction has a goal; its goal is not
destruction but rectification. The deconstructor critiques for
the purpose of betterment; she seeks out unjust or inappropriate
conceptual hierarchies in order to assert a better ordering.
Hence, her argument is always premised on the possibility of
an alternative to existing norms that is not simply different, but
also more just, even if the results of this deconstruction are
imperfect and subject to further deconstruction. Such a
deconstruction assumes that it is possible to speak
meaningfully of the more or the less just.429
We come to this conclusion about postmodernism and normativity only
however, according to Todd, if postmodernism is kept theoretical in mind to
show an “awareness” and not too literally used and externalized as reality
itself.430 In fact, viewing postmodernism as an approach rather than a theory
424. See Todd, supra note 405, at 117.
425. Id. at 114.
426. See id. at 112 & n.55.
427. Id. at 115.
428. J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1131, 1141 (1994).
429. Id. (footnotes omitted) (referencing J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The
Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 124–27 (1993)).
430. Todd, supra note 405, at 116 (“Postmodernism, when used pragmatically, provides tools
for dealing with the problems arising in the postmodern era. . . . Postmodernist laws or labeling laws
postmodern can ‘get the job done’ better than any other method for uncertain areas of the law. When
subjects of the law are in flux and difficult to regulate through regular normative means,
postmodernism can be a useful tool for creating regulation where none would be possible otherwise.
Thus, postmodern awareness can act as a tool to achieve normative human purposes.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also Stephen M. Feldman, Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer’s
Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151, 179 (1999) (“If one doggedly tried to follow postmodern insights to their
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has been a way to balance its workings in legal studies.431 If one values
postmodernism as an approach or methodology to legal studies and not plainly
as a mere theory, then postmodernism and the instrumentality conception are
again aligned. The alignment is in the conception’s approach for accessing a
sense of law’s ontology through its instrumentality. In this way, the
instrumentality conception may use a law’s agency to unravel understandings
that break away false notions of objectivity and to evaluate it more critically.
But at the same time, that unraveling should also push toward the advancement
of law for larger humanistic and social purposes—toward some teleology that
allows for the subjective to come through and for true empowerment. Whether
from a constructivist perspective or otherwise, the instrumentality conception
allows us to question the law in a way that recognizes the human subject within
it and not in a way that assumes some intangible objectivity or some other type
of essentialism. We own the law; it does not own us without collective, social
agreement.432
furthest reaches, then everything would be deconstructed, including those postmodern insights;
imagine traveling continually outward until being caught suddenly in the gravitational field of an
interstellar black hole that was sucking everything, including yourself, into its abyss. So, to avoid such
a deconstructive implosion, we always at some point manage to stop: to talk, to communicate, to write,
to whatever.” (footnotes omitted)). Feldman continues to note that:
Even the most unmitigated postmodernist ultimately uses some postmodern
insights as if they were tools or instruments—to express a point of view. Hence,
the use of postmodern insights in such an instrumental manner does not
necessarily render a writer’s position or point of view prosaic. In fact, for what
it’s worth, although I have criticized Sunstein and Smith as modernist writers who
domesticate postmodern insights, I usually find their work more interesting than
that of other modernist writers who seem to have no grasp of postmodernism at
all. And I typically find the work of a thorough-going postmodernist such as
Schlag even more interesting and provocative. Most important, the work of
postmodern deconstruction does not become trite merely because any text can be
deconstructed. To the contrary, if there are postmodern paths to justice, they lie
in the deconstructive disclosure of the ever-present tacit assumptions and cultural
values that always hide or marginalize some metaphorical Other—an oppressed
and subjugated subcultural group.
Id. at 179–80 (footnotes omitted).
431. See Todd, supra note 405, at 119. Todd observes that the use of labeling something in law
as postmodern shows how “postmodernism can be a constructive tool for appreciating and critiquing
laws that come out of, and contain, postmodern characteristics. . . . The law’s fragmentation,
inconsistency, and flux are identifiable traits that demonstrate the law’s boundaries and limitations,
particular in contrast to modernist laws and rules. As such, the act of labeling is a positivist exercise.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
432. See Minda, supra note 142, at 382. Minda reminds us of the problem for legal theorists
once the human subject of the law is no longer ignored: “If the meaning of law depends on the various
constructions of different subjects, then ‘law’ remains problematized by the identity of the subjects-incontrol of the law.” Id. This reminder would suggest that law is, indeed, not objective and autonomous,
but authored by various human subjects—or in Minda’s words, “subjects-in-control of the law.” Id.
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Thus, the same questioning from above can and ought to be applied to
critique and to study not merely law or particular bodies of law, but also
political systems and institutions that effectuate the law, the process of creating
law, and conceptualizations of law: How are the instrumentalities of a certain
law or a legal regime furthering the ends of liberalism? Neoliberalism?
Morality? Distributive justice? Or just fair deals between private actors?
Similarly through instrumentality, we can seek out questions in regard to a
particular legal doctrine: What instrumentalities allow the parol evidence rule
to accomplish judicial efficiency? Can it be better? Should we be concerned
about judicial efficiency when the matter of establishing a meeting of the minds
involves a tremendous forfeiture for one party? Or ideas about law: Does
pragmatic instrumentalism have any instrumentalities as a way of creating and
interpreting law?
Through an ontological observation and critique that bears on the law’s
descriptive, normative, and practical instrumentalities, studying law in this way
in spirit results in a methodology that can reveal the philosophies, the realities,
the practice, the falsehoods, the inefficiencies, the histories, the politics, and
many other things about the topic of law—without having to assume its
completeness in the method. The method does not have to be inductive, nor
does the Socratic method need to be wholly abandoned. They should just
become options, among others, at the law school podium. The law has agency
potential and thus has qualities that assume instrumentalities, which then reveal
other characteristics and motivations we place upon the law. Whether law
ought to have agency (or not) is a philosophical and metaphysical question that
can also be part of the lecture hall debate for future lawyers as well: Why should
the law embody instrumentality? How do we contribute to that instrumentality?
This perspective stretches this instrumentality conception as an epistemology.
In comparison, although the concept that “law as science” does assert in its
content a normative assumption that law ought to be scientific, the phrase is
more descriptive because of the more concrete object of its modifier (science).
Steering our inquiry and definition of law toward its instrumentalities and away
from a presupposed scientific nature makes the inquiry less confining and,
hopefully, much more resonating in meaning.
C. The Instrumentality Methodology in Four Steps
Within this Article’s subtext has been the ontological idea that one’s
conception of law affects how one objectifies law and thus how one studies
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it.433 In that way, as this subsection will show, the instrumentality conception
is no different than the Langdellian conception in the way that can be translated
into a methodology. However, as we will see as well, the instrumentality
conception’s broader and more neutral preoccupation leads to a more
encompassing style of gathering meaning in law. Under the instrumentality
conception, a methodology for investigation of law by its instrumentalities can
be framed in four sequential steps: (1) establishing instability or gaps in law
that in part fractures formalism; (2) observing the fragments of law created by
the instability that exemplify instrumentality; (3) forming meaning about law
from such instrumentality; and (4) connecting meaning with relevance and
empowerment. Using a course on the law of contracts as an example hopefully
illustrates an application of these four sequential steps.
First, a first-year contracts course could create a contextual instability by
beginning without law at all, but rather a societal want or need—for instance,
the desires for human survival and societal advancement.434 The tension here
is the supposition that without a system (or even a plan), achieving these desires
or needs might be very difficult or impossible. The instability is further
externalized if we notice that in order to advance or even survive, resources
must be shared between individuals framed possibly by a sense of
cooperation.435 Agreements are helpful to facilitate the cooperative exchange
of resources within a society.436 But how does a society, in order to advance or
even survive, make sure that its members are able to agree to exchange
resources and thus cooperate? Human nature, after all, keeps its limits on
altruism. Hence, a need emerges for a system of contract-making to verify that
agreements are made and kept, and to give recourse when agreements fail. Now
the instability is in the qualities of what that system of agreements would look
like. Historical examples of contracting can now be brought into the course to
show students how past societal traditions have created these systems by using
law. What specifically does this legal system of contracting need to emphasize?
Perhaps a legal system of contracting needs to recognize trust, good faith,

433. See supra Part III.
434. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189–90 (Penguin Books 1951) (1651); John
Locke, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND
TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, 10–11 (Oxford Univ. Press
1962); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in BASIC POLITICAL
WRITINGS 141 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987).
435. Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1999)
(“Appeal to a social contract can foster the spirit of cooperation and compromise.”).
436. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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fairness, honesty, and clarity as important values in agreement-making.437
Perhaps such a legal system ought to underscore individual freedom to make
contracts—as much freedom as the political body that houses such a legal
system would allow.438 Or perhaps it should just dictate that individuals must
cooperate or suffer some societal punishment. We would need rules of law to
further the values selected within the various governing ways agreements could
be made. Now suddenly the instability seems less unstable, and we start to see
the instrumentality of law arising in the realm of contracts.
From sociological and anthropological imperatives about agreementmaking, the course can now move into step two of harvesting the specifics of a
system of contracting law. From the fragments of what values a contract law
system might promote in order to sustain and advance a society, students can
be made to examine specifically what kinds of rules such a system requires by
looking at the system of contracting that has developed in American
jurisprudence. There might be need for rules on how parties form agreements,
who can form agreements, and what happens when formed agreements are then
breached. All of these rules ought to, in their own ways, reflect the overarching
societal goals of human survival and advancement but along the way the
combination of values of trust, freedom, honesty, good faith, and anything else
that buttresses the agreement-making process must also be reflected. What
students should encounter at this stage are the gaps that prompt them to ponder
what else do they need to know; or prod their curiosities to find out what such
rules look like in form, and how the law can make happen the endorsement of
the societal values it serves.
Step three requires actual engagement with instrumentality—here in
contract law, that would mean encountering the form in which such
instrumentality arises through reading cases and statutory material, such as the
Uniform Commercial Code, the Second Restatement of Contracts, or the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).
It could also mean encountering the content of instrumentality in the rules of
contract law and seeing for instance, that the rules of contract formation in
437. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
438. E.g., Christina Eberl-Borges & Su Yingxia, Freedom of Contract in Modern Chinese Legal
Practice, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 341, 345 (2014) (“[I]n China, freedom of contract is granted—
unlike in Western legal systems—by ordinary law, not by the Constitution. It follows that no special
constitutional protection applies to freedom of contract in China. This is a substantial difference from
freedom of contract in the Western sense.”).

HO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

198

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

11/21/17 2:46 PM

[101:131

American jurisprudence require, in part, an externalized offer and acceptance
process, in which a meeting of the minds is approximated.439 The
instrumentality of these rules might be examined in multiple layers: How do
these rules serve to create agreements? How easily do these rules serve to
create and facilitate contracts? What are required and how are they
externalized by facts, language, and conduct of parties? How do all of these
rules combined serve the ends of societal advancement? Or in the same realm
of contract formation, students can be asked to see that the consideration
requirement in American contracting tradition tries to underscore the value and
importance of voluntary inducement and freedom of contracting.440 How do
the rules for consideration effectuate those values? What contours are
highlighted in such rules—e.g. bargained-for exchange and immediacy—that
supposedly reflect such values? They might be asked to contrast consideration
rules in American contracting traditions with the lack of consideration
requirement in other contracting systems internationally.441
Here, students can continue their evaluation of the law by tying their
inquiries here to previous inquiries in step one about the advancement of
societal goals—whether the nature of whatever law being discussed fulfills
those goals that the course acknowledged in step one. But step three is also the
moment in the sequence where students begin acquiring reasoning skills by
reading cases or breaking down complex statutory rules and materials. If the
course emphasizes American contract law, step three is where students receive
training on reading cases critically, but also practically; where students learn
the level of authorities in contract law; where students interpret statutory
materials, contractual documents, or both; where students are introduced to
factual analysis and making inferences to facilitate legal arguments and
possibly other skills a professor would reasonably ascertain as essential for law
students to acquire in encountering contracts materials. Thus, step three is both
knowledge-based and skills-based.
In teaching with a pedagogy that emphasizes law as instrumentality, step
four is where hopefully students uncover meaning within the law that is relevant
and empowering to them. For instance, continuing with the lesson on contract
formation, step four might be where students learn how to use the
instrumentalities of the rules for formation to argue objectively and

439. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1981).
440. Id. at § 71.
441. See, e.g., Amy Lee Rosen, Chinese Contract Formation: The Roles of Confucianism,
Communism, and International Influences, 20 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 189 (2013)
(“China only requires offer and acceptance whereas the United States requires mutual assent and
consideration . . . .”).
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persuasively on behalf of parties in litigation. Now we move from
instrumentality in a knowledge-based inquiry to instruction that is strictly more
experience-based. Essentially, the exercise illustrates instrumentality or agency
in the relevant skills of lawyering while it personalizes that engagement of
skills. Another exercise might draft students into learning how to craft contract
formation provisions or rules that better effectuate the societal goals that ought
to be reflected in such rules, but are also mindful of how certain parties and
entities do business. Specifically, this exercise might just involve legislating
over one rule or statute but it would also allow students to see instrumentality
in language that effectuates law, or see instrumentality in the legislation of laws.
Again, the exercise is experiential but the experience seeks to personalize the
engagement by placing the student as the subject of the law. Or perhaps another
exercise here in step four could be transactional: how do we as attorneys draft
agreements that abide by rules of formation and to maintain the best interest of
clients? The students can be given a factual scenario involving the negotiation
of a transaction (a house, an important service, a requirements contract over
goods, etc.) and some differing parameters for each party. Then they are asked
to draft agreements that follow the rules of formation, advance the personal
goals of each party, and maintain the value society places on free exchange of
resources for advancement. Here, this example illustrates instrumentality
within legal documents but also develops drafting skills and experience needed
for those students who are headed to transactional practice. Hopefully as they
gather the knowledge on the law’s instrumentalities in the context of formation
rules in contracts, these exercises allow them to transfer that knowledge to
create a more meaningful interaction with the law and lawyering. By allowing
them to take the meaning they have obtained in their observations about
instrumentalities in steps one to three and transfer such learning to experiences
in step four, students understand that they are the subjects of law. Step four
reveals both relevance and empowerment—relevance in seeing how lawyering
requires both knowledge and skills regarding the instrumentalities of law and
empowerment in the active experience in manipulating and controlling those
instrumentalities in the law classroom laboratory.
Thus, reaching from instability to the qualities of the contract formation law
that underscores its instrumentality shows students both the qualities and the
content of the law on contracting behavior in a particular society. After
students’ interactivity in acquiring knowledge about the law through such
qualities in their study of the cases, statutes, and materials, their experiences of
such knowledge in step four in the lawyering process—whether arguing, rulemaking, or drafting in the context of simulation—creates empowerment for the
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students for engaging in law in the classroom laboratory. Through
instrumentality, they become the Subjects that give the Object of law its
animating life.
Other types of law courses can be taught using the instrumentality
conception. A good use of the four-step process is in the law of remedies, for
when essentially laws fail—its instrumentality breaks down in remedial
relief—and equity must be invoked in order to achieve desired goals of justice
or redress.442 Legal remedies are inadequate in certain situations—perhaps
money is not fast enough or suitable enough to address a nuisance dispute, or
not sufficient enough to deal with infringement of civil rights.443 Or perhaps it
is a declaration of some sort that a claimant requires, rather than money.444 In
this context, the fragmentation of law occurs contextually as law’s failing (step
one). Within the gaps of that fragment, students must find the purpose of
remedies and seek out the instrumentality of equitable relief (step two).
Equitable relief in its various forms through case law and statutes demonstrate
to students an alternative route to redress by governing conduct or allowing a
judicial proclamation.445 Then students must acquire actual knowledge of
equity and its functions through cases and discussions of how equity
functions—for instance, learning the types of declaratory remedies, injunctive
relief, and specific performance orders available and learning how to build a
case for such devices (step three). Finally, students work through simulations
where they draft persuasive requests for equitable relief, and in particular not
overlooking the ability to craft the remedy portion of a hypothetical that
essentially a court would adopt to enjoin another’s conduct (step four). They
can also critique the limits of what can be accomplished. Did the remedy that
they drafted ultimately accomplish something that was sincerely efficacious or
just? Lawyers must know what it is they are reaching for and how to do all of
these things. They should also know the difference between the constructs and
limits of jurisprudence. Hopefully, by teaching equity through instrumentality,
students understand the concepts of law and equity and are empowered with
transfer of that knowledge, not only in litigating toward a remedy, but also in
crafting and then critiquing a remedy.

442. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION 84 (2d ed.
1993).
443. Id. at 86 (discussing the adequacy rule for equity); see also id. at 90 (discussing
“constitutional rights” as a category subject to equitable relief).
444. See id. at 53.
445. Id.
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D. Instrumentality in the Curriculum
Within an instrumentality conception, there might also be further benefits
in the law school curriculum. By viewing law as instrumentality, an indirect
consequence might be the democratizing of courses that were once segregated
by subject matter division and given more importance if they were doctrinal
courses as opposed to interdisciplinary courses or contextual ones—such as
legal history, race and the law, feminist legal theory, law and philosophy,
jurisprudence, and the like. The hierarchy could erode to elevate the
significance of these courses that were once considered, according to Duncan
Kennedy, as part of the “finishing school” of being a lawyer,446 or those that
reflect diversity and plurality in the curriculum if the approach to teaching law
as instrumentality in doctrinal classes is also transferred to these classes by
questioning where is the instrumentality of law in relation to the subject matter.
In other words, the law as instrumentality conception is broad enough to apply
to such courses precisely if such courses are taught in a way that makes students
see the instrumentality of law within a historical, jurisprudential, comparative,
theoretical, or otherwise contextual narrative. In this way, the pedagogy works
into the relevance of courses in upper-level law programming. Moreover, for
courses framed within a certain perspective—such as race, gender, or
sexuality—an instrumentality conception across the curriculum would enable
the exploration of subjectivity in law without perceptions of content
marginalization raised by the dominance of doctrinal courses that tend to
objectify law. By de-emphasizing the objectification of law, an instrumentality
conception would be more conducive to valuing subjectivity in the academy.
This, in turn, would bode well for pluralism in law teaching.
Likewise, as law as instrumentality emphasizes students’ capabilities and
role in facilitating instrumentality, clinical and experiential learning
opportunities in law schools would have a better co-curricular alignment. For
instance, law schools could more thoughtfully program curricular sequences to
balance out the transfer of learning from traditionally doctrinal courses (such
as contract law) with associated advanced doctrinal courses (such as
commercial law or business associations) or skills courses (such as contracts
drafting), or both, in upper-level offerings, and finally experiences in
likeminded clinical courses or externships (such as transactional clinics or work
in commercial litigation). The empowerment effect in the instrumentality
conception might create more meaningful experiences for students in those
upper-level experiential opportunities. The fundamental courses in the first
446. Kennedy, supra note 270, at 61.
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year would converse with experiential learning opportunities and courses in the
second and third years of study.
Ultimately, this pedagogy through instrumentality responds to students in
ways that juxtapose them as the Subjects of law by instilling their relevance in
the material and facilitating their empowerment. Learning is goal oriented.447
Relevance facilitates learning.448 Law as instrumentality is a more relevant
pedagogical concept because it responds to reasons why people attend law
schools: to become lawyers.449 What studying instrumentality does is ask the
student to explore how the law works and what can be accomplished through
its creation and its practices—what lawyers need to know about the law and its
application.450 Thus, as seen in the examples above, teaching through this
instrumentality conception can lead to more immediate engagement.451 In
addition, this conception allows for teaching and inquiry on the contextual and
philosophical questions about the law that add to law’s profound
personalization and meaningfulness for students.452 One way to encapsulate the
trajectory of this method is by positing its reverse-engineering approach to the
law. Let us just assume that that the law is ultimately unknowable. But aspects
of the law that are observable ought to be used for study—its functions, its
accomplishments, its qualities and characteristics, its authors, its degrees of
effectiveness for accomplishing goals through practice and theorizing, even the
failings of its instrumentalities, and the teleological assumptions of those
instrumentalities. In practical and moral terms, our answers to such questions
as posed by all of these observations are what the instrumentality conception
attempts to render in its immediacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Rather than self-destructive behaviors akin to rocking the boat or jumping
ship, this Article has tried to conjure a sense of redemption through progress by
charting a new direction in the philosophy of teaching in American legal
education—one that is reflective of plurality and hopefully enlivens thoughtful,
critical, and energizing debates in the academy for the rescue and salvation of
American legal education. As introduced in these pages, the instrumentality
447. Timothy W. Floyd et al., Beyond Chalk and Talk: The Law Classroom of the Future, 38
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 257, 264–65 (2011) (discussing goal-oriented learning).
448. Id. (discussing relevance in learning).
449. See, e.g., Kyle P. McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward: Transparency at American
Law Schools, 32 PACE L. REV. 1, 56 (2012) (noting “most people attend law school to become
lawyers”).
450. See supra Section IV.C.
451. See supra Section IV.C.
452. See supra Section IV.C.
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conception directs us away from the objectification of law by not embracing
the aesthetic preferences of the Langdellian formalists but looking more
ontologically in the belief that the instrumentalities of law can lead to the
acknowledgment of subjectivity and eventually, meaning and understanding.
The only objectification of law that occurs in this instrumentality conception
does so in larger relation to the Subject of the law because the conception allows
us to acknowledge our study more transparently when the act of inquiry
involves acknowledging our own sifting through of the fragments of law in
order to draw relevant meaning that emboldens our capabilities to advance law
and also to critique that advancement. A perspective from instrumentality, thus,
tames the law for its Subject—for our students, and ultimately for us, as we all
bring law to life. Henceforth, this conception allows us to transfer the meaning
of law back to an instrumentality within our control.
To be sure, the former conception of law as science and its reflected
pedagogy in the case method has had its place in the study of law and training
of lawyers, and ought to have a presence in the future, as it would have within
an instrumentality conception—just like case law has its continuing importance
in our legal system. But it would become only one kind of method, amongst a
variety of methods in the same way that case law is only one kind of law. Thus,
the dominance of the case method should be lessened to make way for other
methods and realities of law; and it would be lessened within the
instrumentality conception.
Ultimately, this conception, as methodology, seeks to reveal law’s
relevance and use its demonstrative experiences to empower individuals.
Lawyers have agency, and thus transitively, they personify the instrumentality
of law as well.453 Accordingly, future legal inquiries through instrumentality
will lead to questioning how lawyers contribute or embody agency. This hope
at the heart of that conception’s directive is to reveal the human in law in order
to better educate lawyers. American law schools and legal education also
possess agency and instrumentality. Our current and future students will
become the stewards and captains of legal knowledge, thought, and practice
long after the current cries of crisis have passed. The instrumentality
conception would imbue them with knowledge and technique relevant to their
present and future stations in the law and engages them to find meaning and

453. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities,
53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 1027 (2005) (“What defines the technical as a sphere of social practice, in other
words, is lawyers’ commitments to an aesthetic of instrumentality, not simply to an instrumentalist
politics or project.”).
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power inwardly so that they do not just learn to think like lawyers but also to
transform. This vast and noble possibility in the lecture halls of law schools is
ultimately the instrumentality that the academy must embody in revealing law’s
meaning.

